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ABSTRACT

This study examined the feasibility of a U.S. Army collegiate commissioning program (CCP) as a supplemental method of officer procurement. Investigated were the U.S. undergraduate population, Army procurement goals, program production capabilities, costs, and retention rates projected through fiscal year 1982. A sufficient college population will exist through fiscal year 1982 to meet projected officer procurement goals. However, existing officer programs may produce a significant annual deficit after 1980 because they do not thoroughly cover the collegiate population. Among the study's findings are that: (1) a CCP can initially produce 3,000-4,000 new officers per year; (2) CCP source officers will cost about $10,000 per capita; (3) CCP officers can be expected to experience a 15 to 28 percent retention rate beyond ten years' commissioned service; (4) expansion of existing Army procurement programs to meet projected officer goals is not cost-effective; (5) CCP can be expected to alleviate most of the officer shortfall; and (6) CCP will procure officers at a lower cost than any other program. (MSE)

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THE ARMY COLLEGIATE COMMISSIONING PROGRAM --
A FEASIBILITY STUDY

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency.

ABSTRACT

This study examined the feasibility of a U.S. Army Collegiate Commissioning Program (CCP) as a supplemental method of officer procurement. The study assumed that any CCP will operate like the Marine Platoon Leaders Class (PLC) Program and used data from the PLC Program and existing Army programs (ROTC, USMA, OCS) as the basis for predicting CCP results.

The study investigated the U.S. undergraduate collegiate population, Army officer procurement goals, program production capabilities, costs, and retention rates, projected through fiscal year 1982.

The study found that through FY 1982 a sufficient collegiate population will continue to exist to meet projected Army officer procurement and production goals. Existing officer programs, however, may produce a significant annual deficit after 1980 because they do not thoroughly cover the entire undergraduate population. The study also found that (1) CCP can initially be expected to produce 3,300-4,000 new officers per year, (2) that CCP source officers will cost about ten thousand dollars per capita (in 1975 dollars), and (3) that CCP officers can be expected to experience a 15-28% retention rate beyond ten years commissioned service.

The study determined that (1) expansion of existing Army procurement programs (ROTC, USMA, OCS) to meet projected

FY 82 production goals is not cost effective, (2) that CCP can be expected to alleviate most of the expected officer shortfall and (3) that CCP will procure officers at an initial and at a ten-year per-capita cost lower than any existing program.

The study concluded that CCP is a feasible supplement to existing programs in terms of procurement potential and productivity, cost effectiveness, and retention. The study also concluded that the combination of existing programs (with present operating costs per-capita) plus CCP (similarly funded) may not achieve projected FY 1982 production goals. The study recommended development of a CCP model for detailed analysis and evaluation during the next 16-36 months (September, 1978-May, 1980).

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CHAPTER I

THE COLLEGIATE COMMISSIONING PROGRAM: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The Department of Defense is charged to provide the United States with an economical and effective defense structure. Managers within the Department of Defense are constantly searching for ways to improve the defense structure at a lower cost. Programs that are not cost effective usually cannot be justified to the Congress. The Defense Department's concern over money allocated to officer procurement programs is typical of the concern expressed towards any big budget item; programs that have proven performance records rarely encounter difficulty in Congress while those programs that produce officers at a higher cost usually encounter a great deal of difficulty.

A recent development in the officer procurement area is the idea of an Army Collegiate Commissioning Program (CCP). The program originated in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and centered around the idea of recruiting male undergraduate college students for an officer program that did not require attendance in ROTC type classes but did require ten or twelve weeks of precommissioning training during summer vactions.[1] After the student completed his training and earned his bachelor's degree he would be commissioned as a reserve officer and assigned to active duty for three years.

Need for the Study

The CCP Program has been discussed within the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army and the Marine Corps but there has not been a comprehensive study of whether CCP can actually do what the Army believes such a program would have to accomplish.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to determine whether an Army Collegiate Commissioning Program is potentially a worthwhile officer procurement source. The areas to be investigated are:

(1) If Army officer production requirements do not change, can ROTC produce its assigned share of officers through 1982?

(2) Is there a sufficient male full-time undergraduate population to annually produce 4,500-5,000 CCP source officers?

(3) Will CCP be cost effective in comparison to other Army officer procurement programs?

(4) What will be the comparative retention rate of CCP source officers?

Method of Study

This study investigates the feasibility of a Collegiate Commissioning Program by reviewing Army ROTC production requirements through 1982 and then comparing recent historical ROTC participation and production levels against the available male ROTC college population. The CCP production question has been reviewed by identifying the full-time undergraduate male population at both Army ROTC and non-Army ROTC colleges and applying recent ROTC and PLC procurement and attrition data to predict potential production.

This study assesses per capita cost by reviewing PLC assigned accession expenses and Army CCP cost estimates and comparing these costs against the stated expenses of other major officer procurement programs.

Comparative retention rates by procurement source beyond ten years commissioned service were reviewed and, based upon cost per accession and the retention rate, a comparative cost per officer by program was determined.

Assumptions

There are two fundamental assumptions inherent to the study: (1) That a CCP will operate in a manner similar to the Marine PLC Program and (2) that students will participate in CCP for the same reason that members participate in the Army Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC): to earn a commission or determine if they want to earn a commission in the Army.

Limitations

This study did not address the impact of potential increased female participation in ROTC or the possibility that the Army might substantially alter the existing ROTC ratio between males and females in order to achieve annual production goals.

Further, the potential market at junior colleges was not analyzed because it was believed that CCF source officers who possessed only an associate degree would not be educationally competitive with officers from other commissioning sources who possessed a bachelors degree.

The potential for increased production from the U.S. Military Academy was not addressed since higher production would require the expansion of existing facilities and this expansion could only be achieved at a cost which Congress would probably consider prohibitive.

The Officer Candidate School (OCS) was not considered a likely source of additional officers. In view of the current Army plan to increase OCS production from 350 in 1975 to 2,165 by 1978 it is probably not reasonable to expect OCS to produce an additional 3,000-5,000 officers annually.[2]

Forecast of Subsequent Chapters

This study evaluates the feasibility of an Army CCF by presenting and interpreting information in the following manner:

Chapter II: A review of related literature and the recent performance of the PLC Program has been conducted.

Chapter III: ROTC procurement and production goals through FY 1982 and a market analysis of potential CCF production constitutes the majority of Chapter III. The chapter concludes with a brief presentation of per capita costs by program and retention rates of career officers by commissioning source.

Chapter IV: This chapter is essentially an analysis of the evidence presented in Chapter III as it relates to CCP potential capabilities in the areas of procurement, production, attrition, cost and retention.

Chapter V: Conclusions and recommendations regarding areas that might merit further study are presented.

Background

The CCP has never been authorized to recruit an officer or been allotted any money by Congress. The program is a concept that was initially discussed between representatives of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA)) and the Marine Corps Officer Procurement Section during October and November of 1974.[3] The representatives from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&RA) were interested in learning all they could about the Marine Corps Platoon Leaders Class (PLC) Program so that they could build a CCP model that might resemble PLC. The purpose of the CCP concept and model development was apparently to determine whether a PLC type program could satisfy increased Army production requirements, supplement ROTC and avoid the need to ask Congress for an increase in the Army ROTC Scholarship Program. The Marines provided the information with some unstated misgivings because the prospect of the Army entering a virtually private Marine Corps recruiting source was unattractive. Unknown to the Corps at the time, the Army was equally suspicious of the CCP concept because the procurement appeal of the program was uncertain.

The Marines heard very little about CCP during 1975. This was just as well since the Marine Corps Officer Procurement Section was engaged in preparing correspondence to the Department of Defense regarding an attempt to secure permanent authority for their PLC stipend program. This effort, which then did not appear to be related to CCP, proved to be the rebirth of the CCP concept.

The Corps forwarded its recommended proposal for status of the stipend to the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense concurred with the proposal and in March, 1976, added another proposal to the Bill. The March 11, 1976, letter from Mr. Richard A. Wiley, Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget stated in part:

> The purpose of the proposed legislation is to authorize financial assistance to members of the Marine Corps Platoon Leader Class (PLC) program and to extend such financial assistance to other similarly situated officer candidates while they are pursuing a baccalaureate degree. This will permit the services to actively pursue an officer procurement program which can be expected to provide a stable base of required officer accessions each year in a zero draft or all-volunteer force climate.[4]

There was never any question that the other services had the authority to develop a commissioning program similar to the PLC Program; that authority already existed under Section 600, Title 10, U.S. Code.[5]

The significant issues in this correspondence were that the other services could develop a PLC type program with a comparable stipend and that the CCP idea was resurrected. If in fact, the concept had ever died.

CCP took another step forward on June 3, 1976, when Vice Admiral John G. Finneran, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Personnel Policy) testified before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Committee on Armed Services that the CCP concept might benefit the active military forces by attracting officers at a lesser cost in comparison to ROTC and that a CCP with a stipend could supplement the academies and the ROTC programs.[6] This testimony indicates that Admiral Finneran and his staff obviously thought that a CCP was cost effective in comparison to ROTC. Later, during the same hearing, Admiral Finneran testified to Senator Nunn that some ROTC units which had not been operating at productive rates had either been closed or placed on probation and that he believed that a Collegiate Commissioning Program could be used to manage the ROTC program and reduce the overall cost of a commission without jeopardizing the officer force structure.[7] Admiral Finneran apparently believed that if a CCP was instituted then some of the least productive ROTC units could be closed and the cheaper CCP would produce more than enough officers to make up for the ROTC closings.

Since CCP appeared to be attractive to Admiral Finneran, the subcommittee was anxious to find out what the Army thought about the program. Their position was somewhat guarded. Passage of the Bill was recommended in the Army's statement but CCP was not a procurement source that was going to be developed unless ROTC failed to meet production goals.[8]

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The Army position was not surprising. ROTC had been a successful procurement source and as long as it remained that way the Army had no desire to enter a market that possessed unproven potential.

Admiral Finneran's testimony frequently referred to cost effectiveness and that CCP would be a cheap source of good officers. At one point in the proceedings, Admiral Finneran stated that the Army ROTC Scholarship Program cost approximately $22,000.00, the Army ROTC (non-scholarship) commissionee cost $13,000.00, the PLC averaged about $11,000.00, and the NROTC (non-scholarship) cost about $24,000.00.[9] He apparently provided the cost data to indicate that if CCP were like PLC, it would be comparatively inexpensive.

Admiral Finneran's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 3, 1976, resulted in an extension of the stipend law until June 30, 1977, at which time the law will require either permanent statutory authority or termination. Should the law be enacted, then the CCP concept will be an alternative available to the Army. There is no reason to believe at this time that the CCP concept will be changed before the Bill is reintroduced to Congress in 1977.

There is a reasonable possibility that an Army CCP would be similar to PLC in the areas of attrition and production. Since CCP could behave like PLC, a review of the Corps' experience with PLC could be a worthwhile method of examining the CCP potential.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Based upon a conference at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps between representatives of the Marine Corps Officer Procurement Section and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Subject: The Collegiate Commissioning Program, Officers present: Lt. Col. B. H. Thomas (USMC), LTC Jack Gentry (USAF), MAJ P. E. Tucker (USMC), Capt. J. E. Ingersoll (USMC), Washington, D.C., October, 1974.

[2] Department of Defense, "Officer Accession Plan (Line Officer and MSC) FY 77-82" (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1976) (n.p.).

[3] Conference at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Subject: The Collegiate Commissioning Program, *op. cit.*

[4] Based on Official Correspondence between Mr. Richard A. Wiley, Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, and the Honorable James T. Lynn, Director, Office of Management and Budget, March 11, 1976.

[5] U.S., General and Permanent Laws of the United States in Force on January 20, 1971, *10 U.S.C. 600*.

[6] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, *Marine Corps Platoon Leaders Class*, Hearing, 94th Congress, 2nd Sess., June 3, 1976 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 3.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND THE MARINE CORPS PLC PROGRAM

This chapter contains a general literary review and the background and recent performance of the PLC Program. The review of literature is essentially directed at the reasons certain types of material were used, where this material originated and how the information supports subsequent chapters of the study. A detailed documentary review is contained in Appendix C. The recent performance of the PLC Program has been presented in order to provide historical background and a data base that can be related to CCP later in the study.

Review of Literature

Officer procurement programs attracted a great deal of interest prior to 1973; however, since the end of the college protest era and U.S. involvement in Indochina there has been a general reduction in the amount of published material.

The material published in books, newspapers, magazines and other periodicals from 1966 to 1973 usually addressed the problems that ROTC was encountering on campuses throughout the country. It is difficult to review general interest type magazines (Time, Newsweek), military magazines, The Congressional

Record, major newspapers or various Presidential Commission reports that were published during this period without discovering an article relating to the military recruiting system. Many of these articles were critical of the military or offered little prospect that officer procurement would ever recover from the Vietnam War.

This material is generally outdated when studying current or potential problem areas; however, the articles do have historical value.

The literature relative to this study is essentially either produced by the Department of Defense (DOD) or one of its subsidiary agencies or the DOD has been a primary source for the material (extracts from the Congressional Record, studies, or essays). The only exceptions to this statement concern various statistical publications (Yearbook of Higher Education, Accredited Institutions of Higher Education) regarding undergraduate enrollment projections and portions of laws that address officer procurement.

Investigation of the feasibility of implementing an Army CCP addresses four areas: (1) potential ROTC production, (2) potential CCP production, (3) comparative cost, and (4) potential retention. The available information regarding these areas is generally located in published regulations and reports or unpublished point papers, accession plans, fact sheets, talking papers, letters and memorandums. Despite the fact that much of the material is unpublished, there did not appear to be any reason to suspect that it was invalid or inaccurate.

In fact, to the contrary, it was probably very accurate since the material was prepared by numerous Army and Marine action officers and used in correspondence with Congress, the Office of Management and Budget and the respective services to develop future requirements and goals or to assess program performance.

Since the majority of the literature has been collected from Headquarters, Department of the Army; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; the Office of Institutional Research, West Point, New York; and reports from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the material is not readily available to the average scholar. The information upon which this study is based was obtained after a microfiche search of the Defense Documentation Center from the data terminal located at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; correspondence with the Director of Institutional Research, Office of Institutional Research, West Point, New York; visits to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and visits to the Recruitment Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. Both the Army and Marine Corps were willing to provide copies of unpublished data and further clarify the data contents in informal discussions.

The facts, analysis and conclusions presented in subsequent chapters are derived from the previously mentioned material.

The ROTC production analysis through 1982 is supported by a historical review of recent ROTC performance and ROTC production goals established by the Army. Reports from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and statistical data regarding projected ROTC enrollment levels were compared against projected male undergraduate enrollment levels through 1982. The latter information was obtained from The Yearbook of Higher Education.

Information upon which to analyze potential CCP production was provided from Marine Corps PLC enrollment, attrition and commissioning reports, an analysis of the non-Army ROTC college undergraduate population and recent ROTC participation levels derived from reports of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

The comparative per capita and estimated gross costs of CCP were compiled from letters between the Department of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget, testimony in the Congressional Record, memorandums of Army and Marine officers, reports, talking papers, fact sheets and point papers provided by Headquarters, Department of the Army and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

Potential CCP career retention in comparison to the career retention levels of existing officer procurement programs was obtained by a review of retention data provided by the Office of Institutional Research and unpublished material available in the Marine Corps Recruitment Branch and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs).

Since any Army CCP would exist within the framework of the law, it was necessary to review the statutes which related to military commissioning programs. The specific laws which appear to have the greatest bearing on officer procurement programs in general are Title 10, U.S. Code and Title 37, U.S. Code.[1] Public Law 92-172 has a specific application to CCP because permanency of the statute will permit the Secretary of the Army to develop an Army CCP with a stipend.[2]

This study has addressed a different potential method of Army officer procurement. The idea is not novel because the Marines have used a PLC Program for forty-two years;[3] however, the literature, because it is essentially raw data, has required a considerable amount of tying together and attempting to correlate Army material or existing Army programs. Further, after the Army and Marine data was analyzed it was necessary to assess the potential productivity of a hypothetical program based upon statistical estimations of future college male populations. In the area of assessment of potential CCP productivity and the relative ROTC participation percentages of male students at Army ROTC sponsor colleges of different sizes, this study, to the best of the writer's knowledge, is original.

PLC Background

The Marine Corps PLC Program is an officer candidate program for full-time male undergraduate students (less seniors) who are attending regionally accredited colleges or universities.[4] Successful completion of all precommissioning training requirements and receipt of a baccalaureate results in appointment as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.[5]

The PLC Program was founded in 1935 and since has become the keystone of Marine Corps officer procurement. Currently, PLC produces in excess of forty percent of all U.S. Marine Corps Reserve officers.[6] Further, when the PLC sister program, the Officer Candidate Class Program, is added to production figures these two programs produce nearly seven of every ten Marine Corps officers.[7] The Marine Corps obtains the remaining thirty percent of its officers from the Naval Academy, active duty sources and the NROTC (Marine Option) Program.

PLC procurement, while always significant, has not always recruited as many students as the Marine Corps desired. In fact, from 1968 through 1971 the program consistently failed to reach quota objectives and the Marine Corps became concerned that one of its two major sources of officers was becoming a noncompetitive program.[8] In view of the four year failure trend, the Marine Corps started a major effort to revitalize PLC by requesting the Department of Defense to sponsor legislation in Congress which would provide an optional stipend corresponding to the monthly subsistence payments awarded members of the ROTC Advanced Course.

The Department of Defense concurred with the recommendation and requested the Department of the Navy to provide draft legislation and correspond with the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Acting Secretary of the Navy John W. Warner outlined the Marine Corps Financial Assistance proposal in correspondence on February 20, 1971:

> It is envisioned that under normal circumstances, Financial Assistance could be provided to a selected Platoon Leaders Class candidate only during the school year (nine months) and then only if he satisfactorily completes the required military training during the previous summer. There would be no additional clothing, training or travel expenses beyond those currently existing in the present Platoon Leaders Class. A stipend equal to that paid to members of the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps is considered an appropriate amount to provide partial assistance in defraying educational costs, though not so much as to be the main attraction for enrollment. In return for acceptance of financial aid, individual candidates would become liable for a minimum of two years enlisted service should they fail to complete the program by acceptance of a commission, with an increasing service obligation of six months for each part or whole school year during which financial assistance was received. With acceptance of a commission, an officer's initial period of active duty would be increased by six months for each academic year during which he received subsidy, commencing with a two and one-half year obligation for those who complete the program without drawing any subsidy.[9]

The Congress approved the Financial Assistance proposal and the President signed Public Law 92-172 on November 7, 1971. The law provided the payment of a stipend, at the same rate authorized for Senior Course ROTC cadets, to eligible members enrolled in a Marine Corps Officer Candidate Program.[10]

The PLC Program experienced a surge in recruiting immediately after passage of the law and for the first time since 1967 the annual quota was exceeded.[11] Further, the recruiting quota had not been reduced in order to attain the necessary numbers.[12] Since 1972 the PLC Program has consistently exceeded recruiting quotas.[13] Appendix A, Tables 1-5 are a detailed examination of PLC production and recruiting results from 1968-1976.

It is possible that the PLC stipend was not the only factor which contributed to PLC success. The improved campus recruiting climate, the diminishing role of the U.S. military in Indochina and an economic recession may also have contributed to increased PLC success.

Recent PLC Performance

The Marine Corps conducts PLC recruiting through Marine Corps Officer Selection Officers (OSOs) located in fifty-eight cities throughout the continental United States. These officers recruit eligible male college freshmen, sophomores and juniors at regionally accredited colleges and universities for the PLC Program through a quota system that is roughly established by analysis of the male undergraduate population within the six Marine Corps recruiting districts. Officer Selection Officers are not restricted from recruiting at universities where other commissioning programs are located and it is interesting to note that of the 606 PLC officers commissioned in Fiscal Year 1974, 404 were located at campuses which hosted either NROTC, AFROTC, or Army ROTC.[14] This fact is not really surprising since ROTC programs are usually located at the larger universities and the Marine Corps Officer Selection Officer traditionally has conducted his recruiting efforts where he can reach the largest potential recruiting population in the shortest time. There are probably some exceptions to this practice, particuarly when a small college has a history of PLC interest, but in general, the recruiter travels to the greatest population centers.

The PLC is a program that permits voluntary disenrollment unless a member has received the stipend. The voluntary disenrollment concept occasionally causes difficulty in retaining members and attrition is always a source of great concern. This attrition can be identified by two major areas: training attrition and nontraining attrition.

The PLC member who is enrolled as either a freshman or sophomore will attend two six week summer training sessions and the PLC junior will attend one ten week training session. All training is conducted at Officer Candidates School, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia.[15] PLC training attrition since 1970 has not fluctuated more than ten percent and has averaged about twenty percent per year.[16] There are a number of factors which have a bearing on training attrition, not the least of which is the training philosophy of the commanding officer. For example, training attrition in the PLC Program between 1973 and 1975 decreased by nearly seven percent and only one significant factor changed during that period: the commanding officers.[17] Table 6, Appendix A indicates 1969 training attrition was lower (9.13 percent) than in subsequent years. The answer can be attributed to the PLC conditions of release at that time: PLC summer training failures were assigned to recruit training at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina. Apparently the specter of "boot camp" was a powerful stimulus to complete summer training. Draft pressure during that period was probably another factor that kept attrition at a lower level. The practice of requiring summer training failures to attend recruit training was discontinued in 1970.

PLC training attendance projections for 1977 and 1978 are optimistic but probably attainable if attrition in the program continues to decrease. The Marine Corps projected in June, 1976, that 3,150 candidates would report for training in each of these years and approximately 2,500 would complete training.[18]

The second factor in the PLC attrition equation is nontraining losses. The PLC members of the graduating classes of 1972-1975 provide some insight into total attrition and since training attrition is generally predictable, nontraining attrition can be deduced. From 1968 through 1975 the annual PLC input was approximately 2,200. This input was subdivided by academic classes in the following manner: 900 freshmen, 700 sophomores and 600 juniors. The freshmen and sophomores attended training twice and lost about twenty percent of the class each time they attended training. Hence, the 1,600 freshmen and sophomores were reduced to approximately 1,000 by the time they completed all of their precommissioning training. The juniors attended one ten week summer training session and graduated about 480 of the original 600. Since only 31.29 percent of all PLC members are commissioned and 2,200 were procured, 688 could be expected to successfully complete the program.[19] This implies that 1,512 members did not complete the program and 720 of the 1,512 failures were training failures. If 720 is subtracted from 1,512 it can be determined that 792 were nontraining losses; or the average nontraining loss during the undergraduate period was fifty-three percent of the total losses. The PLC cumulative attrition figures at Table 7, Appendix A confirm this deductive process.

The PLC stipend was briefly addressed in Chapter I to permit the introduction of the evolution of CCP; however there was no discussion of the stipend as a management tool. Simply put, the stipend program is the Corps' "mailed fist in a velvet glove." PLC candidates who receive the stipend agree to accept a commission or, if they become unqualified for a commission for other than medical reasons, perform active duty as an enlisted Marine.[20] (The enlisted obligation is rigidly enforced.) The stipend program has grown from 444 in 1972 to 1,022 participants in 1976.[21] The Marines project that by 1980 they will spend an estimated $1,260,000.00 for 1,400 participants.[22] While it is too early to establish a trend, the stipend program has attracted about thirty-five percent of the eligible PLC population for the past four years.[23] This constant percentage has permitted the Marines more accurately to predict production from PLC and these predictions, if they continue to be accurate, can serve as a stabilizing influence on the planned input of short term programs like the Officer Candidate Class. Another benefit which has probably accrued from the stipend is decreased attrition. PLC source officers who graduated from college in 1975 had a modest four percent less attrition than those who graduated in 1972, a class which did not have the stipend program.[24] This attrition decrease occurred during a period when such pressures as the absence of the draft and the new Marine Corps policy of voluntary release from CCS without mandatory recruit training could have caused attrition to increase. Further, there is virtually no attrition among stipend participants. While records have not been maintained on the stipend program other than the names of stipend participants and the reasons that caused separation, it appears safe to speculate that less than five percent fail to gain a commission. It is probably too early to attribute the entire attrition decrease to the stipend program, however, the initial results are encouraging and if the trend continues the stipend program will have proved its worth as a tool in reducing attrition.

The Marines established in 1973 a conceptualized goal for the production mixture from their various officer procurement programs.[25] The PLC portion within the total was fifty-eight percent.[26] A review of Marine Corps officer production from 1970 to 1976 indicates that PLC has not produced its conceptualized share (Table 13, Appendix A). Since the Marine Corps commissioned the required number of officers during the seven year period it is obvious that some of the other programs were producing more than their planned share. The Marines were probably fortunate that they did not commit themselves to the conceptualized goal by depending on PLC to produce fifty-eight percent while decreasing production from their other officer sources. The production mix which the Marines thought best, and the PLC failure to provide its share of the whole, was not so much an indictment of PLC as it was of the planners who developed the idea. A key point to be learned from the Marine experience is that reliance on a single program to produce fifty to seventy percent of the total requirement is extremely dangerous. If such a plan is actually implemented, then substantial resources must be committed to that program. Resource commitment and a disproportionate requirement placed on one program decreases flexibility across the entire spectrum and could jeopardize the overall goal because other procurement programs may not be able to speed up production in time to offset the deficit.

The Marines might have reached the PLC conceptualized goal by a substantial increase in recruiting resources or a restructuring of PLC by making the stipend mandatory; however, the other programs would still have been in operation and it is unlikely that a shift in existing resources would have been sufficient to cover the increased PLC requirement and still keep every other program open. If the stipend had been made mandatory, many members might have disenrolled rather than accept the active duty obligation. History has proven that commitment to the conceptualized goal was an unnecessary risk.

PLC Cost and Retention

The PLC Program had an estimated assigned cost in 1975 of $11,900.00 per commissionee.[27] The itemized cost elements are located in Table 8, Appendix A.

Retention of PLC source officers who have between ten and twenty years of commissioned service is twenty-eight percent.[28]

The Military Academy has a retention rate of over sixty percent[29] and the Army ROTC scholarship program has a retention rate that exceeds forty percent.[30] The PLC retention rate is smaller than West Point and scholarship programs but these rates are difficult to compare because officers from reserve source programs do not have the same opportunity to remain on active duty that is afforded to regular source officers. The Marine Corps has especially stringent requirements for reserve officers to augment into the regular establishment. PLC source officers must compete with other reserve officers for the limited regular officer vacancies in a particular year group and it is not inconceivable for a year group already to be filled with the maximum number of regular officers. Under this condition, no reserve officer could be absorbed into the regular force regardless of his qualifications. To the degree that each military service has different standards for retaining reserve and regular officers beyond their initial period of obligated duty, the Marine Corps reserve officer procurement programs compete at a disadvantage and this disadvantage should be taken into account when comparative career retention rates are evaluated.

The PLC Program occupies a central position in the Marine officer procurement structure. PLC allows procurement flexibility by allowing recruiting at nearly all regionally accredited institutions, yet it generally exists in harmony with NROTC, the Naval Academy and the Officer Candidate Class Program.

PLC requirements are not so large that the procurement structure has become unbalanced. The Marines have preferred a more even approach to officer production and this has permitted a larger number of students to have access to a commissioning program.

The Corps appears to have recognized the need to reach the entire college population with a comparatively inexpensive program.

FOOTNOTES

[1] U.S. General and Permanent Laws of the United States in Force on January 20, 1971. *10 U.S.C. 600*.

[2] U.S. General and Permanent Laws of the United States in Force on January 20, 1971. *37 U.S.C.*, *Supplement I*.

[3] U.S., *Marine Corps Officer Candidate Program Financial Assistance Act*, *Public Law 92-172*. *(1971)*.

[4] Department of Defense, *Marine Corps Order P1100.61C*, *Military Personnel Procurement Manual*, (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, June 2, 1973), pp. 3-11.

[5] *Ibid*.

[6] Department of Defense, "FY 70-76 Reserve and Regular Accessions" (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1976), (n.p.).

[7] Department of Defense, "Cumulative Attrition Reports, 89th-93rd OCC Classes" (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1975) and "Cumulative Attrition Reports, 94th-98th OCC Classes" (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1976), (n.p.).

[8] Department of Defense, "Fact Sheet for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) for Use Before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on June 3, 1976" (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1976), (n.p.).

[9] Based on Department of the Navy Correspondence between Acting Secretary of the Navy John W. Warner and the Honorable Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, February 20, 1971.

[10] U.S., *Marine Corps Officer Candidate Program Financial Assistance Act*, *op. cit.*, (n.p.).

[11] "Fact Sheet for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) . . .," *op. cit.*, (n.p.).

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] "FY 70-76 Reserve and Regular Accessions," *op. cit.*, (n.p.).

[15] *Marine Corps Order P1100.61C, Military Personnel Procurement Manual*, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-12.

[16] (See Table 6, Appendix A.)

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] Department of Defense, "PLC-WOCC Training Estimate" (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1976), (n.p.).

[19] "Fact Sheet for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). . . ," *op. cit.*, (n. p.).

[20] Department of Defense, *Marine Corps Financial Assistance Agreement (Revised 1975)*, (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, June 1975), (n.p.).

[21] Department of Defense, "Financial Assistance Program Results and Projections FY 72-80" (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1976), (n.p.).

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] "Fact Sheet for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). . . ," *op. cit.*, (n. p.).

[24] "Fact Sheet for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). . . ," *op. cit.*, (n.p.).

[25] Department of Defense, "Information on the Platoon Leaders Class Program," (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, May 15, 1973), (n.p.).

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] Department of Defense, "Estimated Cost Data PLC Program" (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1976), (n.p.).

[28] Based on Official Correspondence between Richard A. Wiley, Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, and the Honorable James T. Lynn, Director, Office of Management and Budget, March 11, 1976.

[29] George D. Waters, LTC, U.S. Army, United State Military Academy Letter MAOR of November 23, 1976 to Maj. P. E. Tucker, (West Point: November 23, 1976), (n.p.).

[30] George R. Kleb, LTC, U.S. Army, "Memorandum for the Record DAPE-MPO-3" (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 1, 1975), (n.p.).

CHAPTER III

THE COLLEGIATE COMMISSIONING PROGRAM: AN ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL PRODUCTION, COMPARATIVE COST AND RETENTION

The information in this chapter addresses a CCP conceptualized production goal established by the Army in 1976, ROTC procurement and production goals through FY 1982, a substantive CCP market analysis and the methodology used to establish the market analysis, comparative costs per various officer programs and retention levels by commissioning sources.

ROTC Procurement and Production Goals

The Army's total need for new officers from FY 1977 through FY 1982 ranges from a low of 15,546 in the initial year to a high of 16,834 in FY 1980.[1] The total requirement does not change much; however, the proportion of each program's contribution within the structure changes considerably. The current production plan calls for ROTC in FY 1977 to contribute only thirty-eight percent to the overall goal; however, due to shifts in emphasis during the six year period, by 1982 ROTC must produce sixty-two percent of all officers if the Army is to make its goal.[2] Another way of looking at the ROTC production increase is to compare actual FY 1975 production to FY 1981 planned production. When the two years are compared, the planned ROTC production increase is a staggering 141 percent.[3]

The Army ROTC production problem is even more serious in light of attrition between freshman enrollment and commissioning. Table 29, Appendix B shows that if the Army is to meet ROTC goals then freshman (Military Science I) procurement must increase from 1974-1975 to 1978-1979 by 8,829 cadets and senior (Military Science IV) enrollment must increase by 4,534 cadets. The MS I increase is probably not too difficult to reach since there were 29,309 MS I cadets in 1976-1977 and the Army goal for 1978-1979 is only 30,000; however, the MS IV enrollment was only about 6,000 in 1976-1977 and in two years it must increase to nearly 9,500 without reducing standards. In the past two years, despite considerable effort, MS IV enrollment has only grown by 1,200.

The Army has stated that CCP would probably not be implemented as long as ROTC continues to satisfy requirements in a cost-effective manner.[4] If ROTC is to reach planned goals in a shrinking market some substantial production increases and attrition decreases must occur in the immediate future. ROTC faces a crucial test over the next five years and the test must be passed if overall production requirements are to be achieved without a reshuffling of officer procurement quotas or the establishment of new programs like CCP.

The overall male college market offers some hope. Army ROTC reached in 1975-1976 only about 1,224,000 of the total full-time male undergraduate population of nearly 3,000,000 (Table 8, Appendix B). If the total male population could be reached by Army recruiters there is little doubt that the production outlook would improve and the burden placed on ROTC could be reduced. A key issue is h to identify the total male population, Army ROTC share of that market and the remaining non-ROTC college market in a manner that permits the population to be compared to the Army's officer needs.

An Analysis of Potential Production

The Army established in 1976 that if CCP were implemented, the production requirement would have to be 4,500-5,000 new officers each year.[5] To avoid conflict and duplication between programs, the majority of CCP production would probably have to come from the full-time male undergraduate population at colleges where there was not ROTC. If recruiting was essentially restricted to the non-ROTC college market, the Army could saturate virtually the nation's entire college population and still avoid competition between the two programs. It is conceivable that some CCP recruiting could take place on the ROTC campuses; however, recruiting would probably have to be limited to those male students who could not participate in ROTC because of course overloads, work schedules or a reason that satisfied the Professor of Military Science.

Appendix B contains a CCP market analysis that is based upon a comparison of the full-time male undergraduate population at colleges and universities where Army ROTC is not located.

The analysis was completed by using 1975 data to identify the colleges where ROTC was located and establishing the total male undergraduate population and the total number and percentage of the male student body that was enrolled in ROTC. The participation level by college fluctuated so much that the colleges were subdivided into three groups for purposes of comparison of male enrollment: less than 2,500, 2,500-5,000 and over 5,000. The Army ROTC total market penetration within the three sizes of colleges was identified both by total number and by the percentage of the total who were participating in ROTC. The participants were then further divided based upon the percentage of total students enrolled during 1975-1976 in MS I, II, III and IV.

The derived information was used to establish a base from which to start the CCP analysis. The application of ROTC procurement and enrollment data to a CCP market analysis was based on the assumption that both programs produce the same product: an Army officer. It is assumed that students join commissioning programs because they want to serve in a particular service, or at least find out whether they want to be commissioned in that service. There is some basis to believe that once students are enrolled in CCP the attrition might more closely resemble the PLC experience. For this reason, potential production from CCP will be evaluated first using the ROTC data and then by using historical PLC data.

The CCP market population was established by a series of steps designed to identify by number, size and population those colleges that did not have Army ROTC on the campus and then eliminate from those colleges the associate degree students, females and the service academy populations. The result of these successive reductions in the entire population provided a total full-time male undergraduate population at college where Army ROTC was not located; however, the figure did not identify the population by academic class size. This was achieved by using the percentages of 1975 male students in each class at colleges where ROTC was located and reasoning that there was no indication to suspect that size of academic classes would substantially vary from an ROTC to a non-ROTC college. The only information missing from the ROTC/CCP portion of the market analysis was to assign several values that might indicate potential levels of CCP participation by class and the number of officers which could be produced from the different potential participation levels. Since percentages of ROTC participation had been established for the different sizes of colleges, these percentages were applied to the market population.

The degree of penetration which CCP might make into the market was an unknown factor. In view of the program's unproven potential, three comparisons were made. The first potential CCP penetration assumed that the program could arouse the same interest level as ROTC. This was unlikely because ROTC is an easily recognized program, enjoys high campus visibility, a large advertising budget and has a sizeable scholarship population. In view of these factors, second and third market penetrations were made under the assumption that CCP might arouse two-thirds or one-half respectively of the participation level enjoyed by ROTC. The three factors (same participation level, two-thirds of the participation level and one-half of the participation level) were each assigned a probability of accuracy and averaged, based upon the accuracy possibility. The average figure was identified as the potential CCP production from the non-ROTC college market.

PLC data can be used as a measurement of potential production of officers when the estimated full-time undergraduate male population at non-ROTC colleges has been identified and the average class strength of a single class from its freshman through junior year is established. The PLC commissions about thirty percent of those who join the program and since 5,000 officers are needed, nearly 17,000 must be recruited from a class during the freshman, sophomore and junior years. A percentage of the market population can be identified by taking the CCP/PLC requirement and dividing it by the average strength of a non-ROTC college class. This percentage indicates the proportion of the class that the Army must recruit to produce 5,000 officers. The percentage can then be compared to the percentage that ROTC currently recruits from the ROTC population. This process provides a rough approximation of what CCP, assuming its attrition will be similar to PLC, will have to recruit at non-ROTC colleges compared to what ROTC recruits from host campuses. While the process provides a general estimation of what the CCP recruiting effort would have to produce, it does not consider the population on ROTC college campuses that could participate in CCP. Since only 3.19 percent of the male student body participates in ROTC, and in view of the PLC success at these colleges, there could be a substantial CCP market that would not compete with ROTC (Table 4, Appendix B).

Potential CCP Market Penetration

The undergraduate male population in 1975 located on Army ROTC college campuses was 1,223,554 of which 39,076 were actually participating in ROTC (3.19 percent).[6] Figure 3-1 divides the ROTC participants into groups by the size of the college.

Figure 3-1

College Size	Male Undergraduates	Male ROTC Cadets	Percent of the Student Body
Over 5,000	804,265	12,324	1.53
2,500-5,000	251,569	9,953	3.96
Less than 2,500	167,720	16,799	10.01

The full-time undergraduate population in 1975 was approximately 5,431,000 (71 percent) out of a total student population of 7,633,000 and males made up about 54.5 percent of the population.[7] This information identified the full-time male enrollment at about 3,000,000 of which approximately 1,224,000 (41 percent) were located on ROTC campuses. The remaining students were located at non-ROTC colleges.

There were a total of 1,701 four-year degree type institutions[8] of which 1,061 were non-ROTC institutions with an enrollment of less than 2,500, 114 non-ROTC institutions with an enrollment of 2,500-5,000 and 249 non-ROTC institutions with an enrollment greater than 5,000.[9] Tables 10-13, Appendix B provide detailed information on the number of colleges by size, degree type (two year/four year) and total enrollment. Since some of the base data on college enrollment was 1972 information, a six percent growth factor was applied to estimate the enrollment for 1975 (Tables 10 and 11, Appendix B). The six percent growth factor was applied because college enrollment was projected to increase by that amount over the three year period. The established percentage for male students (54.5 percent) makes it possible to estimate that there would be approximately 458,000 undergraduate mal[illegible]t non-ROTC four year colleges with a male enrollment of less than 2,500 per college. Tables 11-13, Appendix B show this process and further identify that at non-ROTC colleges with a population of over 5,000 the male population would be 2,023,000 while the medium size non-ROTC colleges (2,500-5,000) only have an estimated male enrollment of 79,000 of which nearly 14,000 are located at the service academies. Since enrollment by sex can be identified, the only remaining factor is the percentage of students who are classified as "full-time."

Table 5, Appendix B indicates that the full-time population was seventy-one percent of the total population and there is no available information to indicate that there were more full-time students of one sex than the other. Probably, the full-time population is about seventy-one percent regardless of sex. Figure 3-2 indicates that the non-ROTC college full-time male population should be about 1,817,000.

Figure 3-2

College Size	*Full Time Male Enrollment
Less than 2,500	325,000
2,500-5,000	56,000
Over 5,000	1,436,000
Total	1,817,000

*71 percent of the male enrollment

The logic of this method and the probable accuracy of the deductive process can be confirmed by adding the ROTC eligible population of 1,224,000 to 1,817,000 (non-ROTC full-time male population) and the ROTC percentage again equals approximately forty-one percent and the total full-time male student population is about 3,000,000. The non-ROTC population can now be identified by academic class. Figure 3-3 provides a breakdown of these classes.

Figure 3-3

Class	% of Total	Full-Time Male Enrollment
Freshmen	30	545,000
Sophomores	23	418,000
Juniors	24	436,000
Seniors	23	418,000

It appears unusual that there could be more juniors than sophomores in four year academic disciplines. The reason for greater enrollment in the junior class probably results from the transfer of two year degree (Associate Program) students into four year disciplines. These students generally are granted junior status.

A review of the 1975 male ROTC participation level indicates that about fifty-one percent of all ROTC participants were freshmen and that the level of participation decreased to twenty percent for sophomores, fifteen percent for juniors and approximately fourteen percent for seniors.[10] Based upon these relative participation levels, each academic class can be examined based on the total participation levels by size of college. Tables 15-19, Appendix B provide a detailed examination of this data. The 1975 percentage of students participating in ROTC was ten percent at the small colleges, 3.96 percent at the medium size colleges and 1.53 percent at the large colleges. When each size grouping of non-Army ROTC colleges had the same percentage of CCP participation as ROTC had on the ROTC college campus the probable production was 6,680 (Table 18, Appendix B). This number exceeded required CCP production and can be accounted for by the fact that about fifty-nine percent of the estimated male population was on CCP target campuses. However, it is unlikely that CCP would have the same participation level as ROTC for reasons that already have been suggested. When CCP penetration was calculated using two-thirds of the ROTC participation level, the program produced 4,415 officers and when the participation factor was one-half of ROTC, the results were 3,349. When the three levels of participation were weighted as to probability of accuracy (Figure 3-4) the results indicated that CCP could fall short of the production objective if recruiting only took place at non-Army ROTC colleges.

Figure 3-4

Level of Participation	Probable Accuracy Factor	Probable Annual Accessions
Same as ROTC	10%	6,680
.66 of ROTC	40%	4,415
.50 of ROTC	50%	3,349

The market analysis would not be complete without an assessment of PLC procurement and retention source data. PLC has historically produced about thirty percent of what it recruited. Since the CCP officer requirement is 5,000, the procurement requirement would be about 17,000 from any one class over a three year period. Table 16, Appendix B contains the estimated full-time male undergraduate population at non-ROTC universities by academic class. The average figures of the freshman through junior classes indicate class strength is 446,000 and total CCP procurement from this class would have to be 16,000 or 3.58 percent of the entire class. This would not be easy to achieve. The total ROTC male participation level at ROTC colleges, with scholarships, recruiting visibility, and advertising is only 3.19 percent (Table 2, Appendix B). Under these circumstances, CCP would have to recruit proportionately more than ROTC if participation was limited to non-ROTC colleges.

CCP production could be increased if recruiting were permitted at ROTC colleges. This would have to be a management decision and the decision would have to evaluate whether the two programs would harm each other if they existed on the same campus. If CCP only recruited students who could not participate in ROTC there still might be enough students to increase CCP production above 4,000. There are well over 1,100,000 undergraduate males on Army ROTC college campuses who do not participate in Army ROTC and if only one-half of one percent of that population participated in CCP the enrollment would be 5,500 of which 770 (14 percent) would be seniors. The Army could gain at least 700 additional CCP source officers, and probably twice that many with very little effort. If 1,000-1,200 CCP source officers could be produced off Army ROTC college campuses it would be difficult to find a set of circumstances that would indicate annual CCP production at below 4,500 officers.

The Comparative Cost of a CCP Officer

Table 23, Appendix B is an estimate of Army CCP cost per officer. This indicates that the CCP officer will probably cost about $12,900.00, or $1,000.00 per officer more than the assigned cost of a PLC. According to the Army estimate, the CCP officer would cost about the same as the ROTC (nonscholarship) officer and about $1,600.00 more than the Army OCS product.[11] The Army cost figure includes several items that are not found in the PLC assigned cost. Conceptually, CCP candidates would apparently participate in reserve units and also have mandatory enrollment in correspondence courses since these items are identified in the cost model. The Army estimate also includes $3,081.60 per officer for the longevity accrued while a candidate and applied to the officer pay over three years of active service. Further, a $1,000.00 stipend payment per candidate is included in the cost. The reason for including longevity and stipend costs in the estimate is unclear since the proposal to start a CCP with a stipend specifically stated "the proposal will terminate existing credit for longevity."[12] The inclusion of longevity costs was apparently in error; however, a $3,000.00 error in cost per officer is rather substantial and has a bearing on the comparative cost of CCP. The inclusion of stipend costs ($1,000.00 per candidate) appears to indicate that the Army CCP cost estimate really is not an estimate but an assigned cost since the Marines have found that nearly sixty-five percent of all PLC members do not want the stipend.[13] Further, the Army CCP cost estimate does not state that stipend participation is a requirement for enrollment.[14] Figure 3-5 shows assigned PLC costs and possible CCP costs excluding or including longevity, the stipend or both.

Figure 3-5

Program	Assigned Costs
PLC	$11,900.00
CCP	12,900.00
CCP w/o longevity, w/stipend	9,819.00
CCP w/o longevity, w/o stipend	8,819.00

Removal of longevity from the assigned costs would make CCP the least expensive Army officer procurement program by nearly $1,500.00 per graduate (Table 24, Appendix E). Complete removal of the stipend from assigned costs is not realistic; particularly since the Army could make the stipend a requirement. Cost is somewhat like a quagmire; the problem is which way to turn and how to escape. Since there are three possible costs (Army estimate, Army estimate less longevity, and Army estimate less longevity and the stipend), a possible solution is to assign weighted probabilities of accuracy. The Army assigned cost is not likely to be correct unless the Department of Defense or Congress scraps the plan to end longevity. The assigned cost, less longevity, is probably the most accurate of the three costs and the assigned cost, less longevity and the stipend, is probably too low. Figure 3-6 contains a possible solution.

Figure 3-6

Method	Probability of Accuracy	Cost
Army Assigned Cost	15%	$12,900
Assigned Cost w/o Longevity	80%	9,819
Assigned Cost w/o Longevity or Stipend	5%	8,819
Weighted Average	=	$10,231.15

The $10,231 price tag still makes CCP the least expensive of all Army officer procurement programs. Reserve officer source programs generally fare better than regular officer programs in the area of comparative cost. 1975 dollar estimates confirm that a Military Academy graduate costs nearly $80,000.00 and the Army ROTC (scholarship) officer costs a little more than $22,000.00. This information indicates that two CCP officers could be obtained for every ROTC (scholarship) officer and nearly eight CCP officers could be produced for every academy graduate (Table 24, Appendix B). Regardless of the uniform an officer wears, the Government is paying a lot more for the "regular" than it is for the "reserve."

CCP Comparative Retention

There are two directions that CCP could follow to arrive at a possible postcommissioning retention level. The first, and most obvious, is that CCP could have the same retention level as PLC because the candidate was recruited and trained like the PLC; however, that level would assume that the CCP officer had about the same possibility of remaining on active duty as the PLC. The second option is that the CCP officer could have about the same opportunity to remain on active duty enjoyed by his Army RTOC (non-scholarship) comrade. Since the CCP officer will be in the Army, he will be subject to Army policies which affect his ability to remain on active duty. A method that shows comparative retention and costs involves assuming that several programs each produced ten officers in a given year and after ten years only a certain number of these officers remained on active duty. Since the retention rates and assigned or estimated costs are known for each program, it is possible to calculate the comparative costs of career officers by comparing the retention rates of officers from various programs who have between ten and twenty years of commissioned service and multiplying the estimated cost per officer times the retention level. CCP can be calculated using PLC retention data and the approximate career cost per CCP officer would be about $36,500.00, a figure which indicates that CCP would be the cheapest source of Army career officers. ROTC (non-scholarship) retention is only fifteen percent[15] and the use of this figure changes CCP's position in the career cost "pecking order" by increasing the cost to produce a career officer to $68,000.00. This amount is still less than the Military Academy, OCS and ROTC (non-scholarship) officers; however, CCP would be more expensive than the ROTC (scholarship) officer (Table 25, Appendix B).

Summary

The Army's current plan requires ROTC to produce thirty-eight percent of the overall FY 1977 officer production goal; however, the plan indicates that ROTC must produce by 1982 sixty-two percent of all newly commissioned officers. The 1982 production level must be attained during a period when overall undergraduate male enrollment is projected to slightly decline.

The projected full-time male undergraduate enrollment at non-Army ROTC colleges is approximately 1,817,000 and CCP could reasonably be expected to produce at least 3,300 new officers each year from this population.

The cost of a CCP source officer should be approximately $10,200. Since all current Army officer procurement programs have assigned or estimated per capita costs in excess of $11,000, CCP would be the most inexpensive source of officers available to the Army.

The retention rate of CCP source officers at beyond ten years' commissioned service should range from fifteen to twenty-eight percent. If retention of CCP source officers were at least twenty percent, the program would be the most inexpensive source of career officers available to the Army.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Department of Defense, "Officer Accession Plan (Line Officer + MSC FY 77-82" (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1976), (n.p.).

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Department of Defense, "Line Officer Accession Requirement Study" (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1976), (n.p.).

[4] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, *Marine Corps Platoon Leaders Class*, Hearing, 94th Congress, 2nd Sess., June 3, 1976 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 7.

[5] Department of Defense, "Cost Justification--Officer Procurement Programs" (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1976), (n.p.).

[6] Department of Defense, *Opening Enrollment Report School Year 1975-1976*, (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, December 15, 1975), p. 4.

[7] *Yearbook of Higher Education 1974-75* (Chicago: Marquis Academic Media, 1974), p. 519.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 538.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] *Opening Enrollment Report School Year 1975-1976*, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

[11] Department of Defense, "Cost to Train a Lieutenant" (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, January 13, 1976), (n.p.).

[12] Based on Official Correspondence between Mr. Richard A. Wiley, Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, and the Honorable James T. Lynn, Director, Office of Management and Budget, March 11, 1976.

[13] Department of Defense, "Fact Sheet for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) for [illegible] Before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on June 3. 1976" (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1976), (n.p.).

[14] "Cost Justification--Officer Procurement Programs," op. cit., (n.p.).

[15] George R. Kleb, LTC, U.S. Army, "Memorandum for the Record DAPE-MPO-S" (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 1, 1975), (n.p.).

CHAPTER IV

THE COLLEGIATE COMMISSIONING PROGRAM: POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

This chapter is essentially an analysis of the evidence presented in the previous chapter. Specifically, the male undergraduate population as it is distributed over ROTC and non-ROTC campuses is examined and the potential strengths and weaknesses of a CCP are reviewed. The potential strengths of an Army CCP could be the ability to more thoroughly cover the entire male undergraduate market at a comparatively inexpensive cost, recruit for the Army Total Force, provide at least 3,300 officers annually and supplement existing officer procurement programs. The most serious limitation to CCP might be the program's potential inability to produce 4,500-5,000 officers each year.

This chapter also addresses attrition management and the comparative costs of CCP and various existing Army officer procurement programs that produce relatively large numbers of officers.

College Enrollment

The current full-time male population is approximately 3,060,000; however, by 1982 the male population is expected to decline to 3,000,000.[1] While the decline is not particularly dramatic, it could have a serious effect on the already marginal ability of ROTC to reach an increased production requirement. The potential ROTC problem is apparent when the 1977 ROTC production requirement of 5,978 new officers is compared against the 1982 goal of 10,009 (Table 27, Appendix B). Further the overall male college population is projected to increase to 4,366,000 by 1980; however, by 1982 the male college population should decline by 113,000, or roughly back to 1975-1976 enrollment levels (Table 5, Appendix B). This declining enrollment may be at the very heart of the CCP issue. The Army plans for 1981 ROTC production to increase by 141 percent over 1975 production and yet, undergraduate male enrollment is projected to be only about three percent greater in 1981 than it was in 1975. Male college enrollment in 1977 and 1981 is projected to be at exactly the same level yet the Army hopes that ROTC will produce 5,978 officers in 1977 and 10,027 officers in 1981 (Tables 5 and 27, Appendix B). The two different levels of planned production from about the same male college population represent an increase of over 4,000 officers.

ROTC currently reaches less than one-half of the full-time male undergraduate market and it does not appear to even reach this portion of the market in an optimum manner (Table 8, Appendix B). It has already been demonstrated that ROTC enrollment is inversely proportional to the total male enrollment. Colleges that have a male enrollment of less than 2,500 enjoy an ROTC participation percentage of ten percent while those colleges with a male enrollment of over 5,000 only have an ROTC participation level of 1.53 percent (Table 4, Appendix B). Further, the total number of ROTC members at small colleges exceeds the ROTC enrollment at large colleges by over 4,000 despite the overall disparity in total college enrollment (Table 4, Appendix B). Table 14, Appendix B indicates that there are an estimated 325,000 full-time male undergraduates at non-Army ROTC small colleges. If the Army could reach this population at the same participation level that ROTC enjoys, then 32,500 potential officer program members might be enrolled. The significance of this information, particularly the participation percentages, is that the Army ROTC recruiting effort may be substantially misdirected.

CCP Potential Capabilities

As suggested, the present Army officer procurement system does not appear to thoroughly cover the total male undergraduate population. The Marines, conversely, can saturate the available market with a variety of officer programs: NROTC (Marine Option), Naval Academy, PLC, Officer Candidate Class Program and several enlisted source commissioning programs. The Marines reach virtually every segment of the eligible population when they desire, but the Army may have largely neglected the potential of 1,424 four year institutions with a total estimated full-time male undergraduate population of approximately 1,800,000 (Tables 13 and 14, Appendix B). The current family of Army programs relegates this sizeable population, and only then after they are college graduates, to a rather limited OCS program that essentially produces officers for the reserve components (Table 27, Appendix B).

CCP may not be a panacea for officer production, but the evidence presented earlier indicates that the program should produce at least 3,300 new officers each year from only non-Army ROTC colleges and if selective recruiting were practiced at Army ROTC institutions, the total production could exceed 4,000 officers. Annual production at these levels represents between twenty and twenty-five percent of the Army's total annual officer requirement through FY 1982.[2] While a twenty to twenty-five percent contribution from CCP might be significant, the Army has indicated that it expects CCP to produce about thirty percent of the total annual officer requirement (4,500-5,000 officers).[3] This production level is probably not possible, but there may be other issues.

Key issues may be that CCP could add a new dimension to Army officer procurement, recruit from a population that is only marginally covered by existing programs, produce officers at a lower cost than current programs, provide increased flexibility by recruiting for the Total Force and possibly become the second largest source of Army officers. These potential advantages assume even greater importance if production could be maximized by managing attrition.

The potential production from CCP could increase without any procurement increase if attrition were reduced. The Marines have found that about fifty-five percent of all stipend participants are academic seniors, thirty percent are juniors and fifteen percent are sophomores. If a market penetration of fifty percent of ROTC participation is assumed at the three different sized colleges, then voluntary CCP stipend participation could resemble the projection in Figure 4-1.

Figure 4-1

Class	Total CCP Participants in a Given Year	Total Stipend Participation
Sophomore	5,885	883 (15%)
Junior	4,221	1,266 (30%)
Senior	3,940	2,167 (55%)
Total		4,316

Since stipend participants are paid $100.00 per month for the nine month academic year, the total expense of a program this size would be $3,884,400. The most important factor in the process is that the Army is virtually guaranteed 2,167 new officers (the seniors who took the stipend). The remaining 1,800 seniors who did not participate in the stipend program would still be uncertain to accept a commission; however, it would probably be safe to estimate that at least fifty percent of that group would accept appointment. Provided recruiting schedules are met, it is difficult to conceive of a situation when CCP would not produce 3,000-3,500 new officers at just the non-Army ROTC colleges. A more optimistic assertion would be that the CCP market penetration was to be two-thirds of ROTC. This set of circumstances would probably produce the results in Figure 4-2.

Figure 4-2

Class	Total CCP Participants	Total Stipend Participants
Sophomore	7,420	1,113
Junior	5,565	1,670
Senior	5,194	2,856
Total		5,639

5,639 stipend participants would cost the Army $5,075,100.00; however, it would guarantee 2,856 new officers each year, and from the remaining 2,300 seniors who did not want the stipend; at least fifty percent could be expected to accept a commission. This would produce nearly 4,000 new Army officers each year. Another set of circumstances that can be constructed around the stipend involves making it mandatory for those CCP students in their junior year who have completed at least one session of summer training. The ROTC information indicates that with a market penetration of fifty percent there would be 4,221 juniors in the program, but the PLC experience indicates that only about thirty percent of those juniors would be willing to accept the stipend; therefore the stipend population predictably would be reduced to 1,266. There is a possibility that the bottom would fall out of CCP if the stipend were made mandatory at the beginning of the junior year because seventy percent of the population might leave the program rather than face mandatory active duty (see note 4).

There are other means of managing attrition within CCP besides the stipend program. The Corps has found that training attrition can be divided into three categories: medical, unsatisfactory performance and individual requests to leave training. There is very little that can be done about medical disqualifications and the Army would probably not want to reduce unsatisfactory performance attrition by lowering standards; however, the candidates who request to voluntarily disenroll are a source of attrition that might be regulated. If voluntary disenrollments are reduced, the results should be increased production. The Marine Officer Candidates School experience with the Officer Candidate Class provides an example. During FY 1975, voluntary disenrollments reached crisis proportions when 1,191 officer candidates reported for training and 232 quit as soon as they could.[5] The voluntary disenrollment percentage for this period was 19.5 percent. During FY 1976, 909 officer candidates reported to OCS and only 65 chose to voluntarily disenroll. The voluntary disenrollments were reduced to 7.2 percent, or only about one-third of the previous year.[6] A skeptic could argue that OCS relaxed it standards but that was not the case. In 1976 OCS failed 7.8 percent of the candidates[7] and in 1975, 7.3 percent were failed.[8] Medical qualifications between the two years did not fluctuate more than one-tenth of one percent. The result was that standards appear to have been roughly the same, yet attrition dropped twelve percent. Twelve percent may not seem like much; however, if three-fourths of the CCP members were in training during one summer and the two different Marine Corps OCC attrition percentages were applied, the difference would be substantial. Figure 4-3 shows what attrition could be using the two attrition percentages.

Figure 4-3

Actual FY 75 Marine OCC Attrition Applied to CCP

Reporting	Total Attrition	Voluntary Disenrollment	Training Failure	Medical	Completing
*22,200	8,703 (39.2%)	4,307 (19.4%)	1,621 (7.3%)	2,775 (12.5%)	13,497

Actual FY 76 Marine OCC Attrition Applied to CCP

Reporting	Total Attrition	Voluntary Disenrollment	Training Failure	Medical	Completing
*22,200	6,061 (27.3%)	1,576 (7.1%)	1,732 (7.8%)	2,753 (12.4%)	16,139

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* Based upon enrollment and penetration factor of .50 of ROTC and assumption that 100 percent of freshmen and juniors and fifty percent of sophomores would attend training during a given year.

The results are almost identical except for the voluntary disenrollment category where the net savings in candidates is nearly 3,000. The overall saving is about 2,400 members. Attrition management cannot be over-emphasized. Careful management of precious manpower resources can reduce attrition, boost recruiting, lower procurement quotas and increase production.

The significance of this information is that no matter how many candidates are recruited, a program can still fail if nontraining attrition is not carefully managed by a stipend program (perhaps mandatory) and if training attrition is not carefully managed by a sound, judiciously administered summer program. Regardless of attrition management, implementation of CCP would not be without a substantial cost.

CCP will not be without some expense; however, if the average cost per officer is $10,231 in FY 1975 dollars, as has been previously suggested, then 4,000 officers could be produced for $40,920,000. This cost does not include Officer Basic Course costs but it does include a one year stipend payment for every officer commissioned through the CCP. 4,000 officers represent about twenty-five percent of the entire annual Army officer requirement through FY 1982. The estimated cost for a Military Academy officer is $79,920.00[9] and the current Army plan calls for West Point to produce 950 officers per year from FY 1978 through FY 1982.[10] If production is achieved based on the estimated individual cost, then the Army will pay $75,924,000 for less than six percent of its annual officer requirement. The Army plans for OCS to produce 2,180 officers in FY 1979[11] at an estimated cost of $11,309 per officer.[12] Should that level of production be reached, OCS will cost the Army $24,653,620 for about thirteen percent of its total requirement. (OCS is currently the least expensive of all Army officer procurement programs.) The ROTC nonscholarship officer costs approximately $13,000.00[13] and his scholarship comrade costs $22,282.[14] Since total Army ROTC scholarship participation is limited to 6,500 people at any one time, when participation is equally divided among four academic classes, the scholarship program could only produce 1,625 officers in a given year at a cost of $36,208,250.

The FY 1979 Army accession plan requires ROTC to produce 7,913 officers[15] of which 1,625 could be scholarship recipients and the remaining 6,288 would be nonscholarship members. The nonscholarship officer costs about $13,000; therefore, the cost for 6,288 of these officers would be $81,744,000 or about twice the price of CCP for only fifty-five percent more officers. When the scholarship and nonscholarship officers and their respective costs are added together to equal the FY 1979 ROTC requirement, costs could resemble the data in Figure 4-4.

Figure 4-4

FY 1979 ROTC Production Requirement and Possible Costs

Program	Possible Production	Cost	% of Total FY 79 Officer Requirement
Scholarship	1,625	$36,208,250	9.76%
Nonscholarship	6,288	$81,744,000	37.75%
Both Programs	7,913	$117,952,250	47.51%

The cost difference between ROTC and CCP might be significant. CCP could probably produce twenty-five percent of the total FY 1979 officer requirement for less than $41,000,000 while ROTC might produce less than fifty percent of the total requirement (less than twice the CCP capability) for nearly three times the CCP cost.

Admiral Finneran's testimony (Chapter I) before members of the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 3, 1976, was probably not far from the mark. His observations regarding the capability of a CCP type program to supplement ROTC production and possibly reduce overall officer procurement cost by eliminating ineffective ROTC units are a real possibility.[16]

Cost and retention are interrelated and it has already been suggested that CCP, based on a cost per officer of $10,231, could be the cheapest source of career officers if only twenty percent of those officers were retained beyond ten years; however, a key question that has not been addressed is whether it is even important to retain twenty or thirty percent of CCP source officers. A possible mission for CCP could be only to produce a substantial number of reserve officers for a three year active duty period or even exclusive duty within the Army Reserve or National Guard. The Army Reserve/National Guard mission would support the Total Force partnership of Active Army--Army Reserve--National Guard and permit ROTC to reduce its generally ambitious overall goal and specifically reduce its planned contribution over the next six years to the Army Reserve and National Guard. Table 27, Appendix B provides a detailed identification of the ROTC commitment to Army Reserve and National Guard officer production. According to the current Army plan, ROTC must produce 10,027 officers by FY 1981; however, 4,750 of these officers are scheduled for the Reserve or National Guard.[17] Further, after FY 1979, over fifty percent of annual ROTC production is scheduled for other than the Active Army.[18] The significant point to be made is that CCP can be a source of relatively inexpensive career officers, three year active duty officers, exclusive source for the Army Reserve or National Guard or a combination of the three. CCP might be a good source of officers for the total Army force.

If CCP can produce 3,300-4,000 officers at the cost that has been suggested, then it should be able to decrease the Army production gamble, supplement ROTC and even eliminate some of the more inefficient ROTC units that drive overall program costs in an upward spiral. Further, if CCP can produce over 3,000 officers each year, it could be the difference between achieving overall production goals or failing to maintain officer force levels.

The Critical Years

1980 and 1981 are the critical ROTC production years for the Total Force. If CCP is going to be started, the decision would probably be related to ROTC's ability to reach production goals in these two years. There are some ROTC warning signals that should clue the Army regarding the establishment of CCP. The graduating class of 1980 entered college in September, 1976. Total beginning ROTC enrollment in this class was 29,309 and the 1980 production requirement is 9,217. The class is projected to have a sophomore enrollment of 13,895 ROTC students in 1977-1978 and 11,227 juniors in 1978-1979. In view of the production requirement, if sophomore or junior ROTC enrollment falls below the projected participation levels then serious consideration should be given to starting a CCP. The graduating class of 1981 does not start college until September, 1977, and the Army believes that 30,000 freshmen will probably participate. Of these 30,000, 13,895 should continue to participate as sophomores. A key point is that the Army believes virtually identical participation levels in the classes of 1980 and 1981 will assure 810 more officers in 1981. This may not be the case. The critical period for ROTC, and, therefore, the decision point for CCP implementation, is the beginning enrollment figures for the classes of 1980 and 1981 during 1978 and 1979, particularly 1978. By this point, both classes will be well along in their college careers and ROTC success or failure signals should be loud and clear. If both classes have enrollment trouble, the Army cannot afford to wait beyond September, 1978, to implement CCP. By this time, the class of 1980 will be starting its junior year and if corrective action is going to be taken by a CCP, it cannot be initiated any later than the junior year. Tables 27-28, Appendix B provide detailed information on ROTC enrollment and planned production. Although CCP appears to be a flexible and inexpensive source of officers, implementation would not be without several problems and limitations.

Potential Limitations

The most obvious CCP limitation is that the program will probably not produce 5,000 new officers each year unless the production from Army ROTC colleges varies from a maximum of 2,700 to a minimum of 1,000. Procurement from only the non-Army ROTC colleges might not even reach 3,500, although production should not drop below 3,300. A decision to implement CCP would have to consider the production capabilities and the associated risks of starting any new program.

A CCP that produced 4,000 officers would cost about $42,000,000; however, if ROTC planned production was trimmed by a corresponding amount the Army should save money because a CCP officer would probably cost less than an ROTC officer. The central money issue is attrition management. If attrition in a voluntary CCP soared, then costs will soar. For this reason, the initial program managers and trainers should be carefully screened. Another cost problem involves the initial advertising outlay. Since CCP would be virtually unknown, a rather substantial outlay for initial advertising will probably be needed. These extra costs could make the cost per officer slightly higher than anticipated. The Army estimates that recruiting and advertising costs should total $1,913.00 per CCP officer; however, the Marine Corps has found that recruiting and advertising costs are $2,693.89 per PLC.[19] The $1,900.00 figure may very well be correct since CCP might produce greater numbers of officers than PLC, but the area of advertising costs should be carefully reviewed.

FOOTNOTES

[1] *Yearbook of Higher Education 1974-75* (Chicago, Illinois: Marquis Academic Media, 1974), p. 519.

[2] Department of Defense, "Line Officer Accession Plan (Line Officer + MSC) FY 77-82" (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1976), (n.p.).

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] If the stipend were made mandatory at the start of the senior year, it is probably reasonable to assert that at least 2,167 would stay in CCP (55 percent of the senior population) and at least one-half of the remaining senior population would ultimately accept the stipend because they had completed precommissioning training. Further, the Marine Corps experience indicates many seniors accept a commission even though they did not participate in an optional stipend program. A mandatory stipend could be a good idea, although the Corps has never tried it. If the stipend were required at the beginning of the senior year the Army could avoid some subsequent attrition. The Marines have found that PLC seniors are more likely to leave the program if they are accepted to graduate school or if they receive a lucrative civilian job offer. Many students are understandably uncertain about the future in September of their senior year. Graduate school applications have not been completed and civilian firms have not started their annual talent search. If the Army required stipend participation in September, it would eliminate the annual graduate school/civilian job losses that the Marines have forced upon themselves. The biggest decision is when to make the stipend mandatory. The Marine Corps experience with relative participation levels seems to indicate that if the stipend were made mandatory, the beginning of the senior year would be the best time to execute the agreement.

[5] Department of Defense, "Cumulative Attrition Report, 89th-93rd OCC Classes" (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1975), (n.p.).

[6] Department of Defense, "Cumulative Attrition Report, 94th-98th OCC Classes" (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1976), (n.p.).

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] "Cumulative Attrition Report, 89th-93rd OCC Classes," op. cit., (n. p.).

[9] Department of Defense, "Cost to Train a Lieutenant" (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1975), (n. p.).

[10] "Line Officer Accession Plan (Line Officer + MSC) FY 77-82," op. cit., (n.p.)

[11] Ibid.

[12] "Cost to Train a Lieutenant," op. cit. (n.p.).

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] "Line Officer Accession Plan (Line Officer + MSC) FY 77-82," op. cit., (n.p.).

[16] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Marine Corps Platoon Leaders Class, Hearing, 94th Congress, 2nd Sess., June 3, 1976 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 3.

[17] "Line Officer Accession Plan (Line Officer + MSC) FY 77-82," op. cit., (n.p.).

[18] Ibid.

[19] Department of Defense, "Estimated Cost Data PLC Program" (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1976), n.p.).

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY

The CCP concept that was developed in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) in 1974 and presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1976 should be an attractive officer procurement source.

The fundamental attractiveness of CCP results from the program's potential to provide insurance against the real possibility that ROTC will not reach planned annual production goals after 1980. Should ROTC fail to reach annual goals, it appears likely that the other Army officer programs will be unable to offset the deficit. CCP, however, should stand a good chance of opening a rather marginally recruited college population to intensive Army officer procurement efforts.

The CCP recruiting effort; however, would only be worthwhile if several questions posed earlier in the study could be answered affirmatively.

The most obvious question is: is CCP, regardless of cost, retention or potential market, even necessary? In order to answer this question it has been necessary to carefully evaluate the ability of ROTC to satisfy its planned goals. Analysis of the data indicates that ROTC must roughly double production between 1975 and 1980 while the market population declines. ROTC has attained recent production goals; however, the effort expended to achieve these modest goals has been substantial and achievement of the post 1980 goals will probably require a monumental effort. The planned ROTC goals appear to be so ambitious that even a massive recruiting effort and increased financial resources might not make much difference. The critical point could well be that ROTC has bypassed some of the most potentially productive colleges.

The ROTC Problem

The data indicate that small colleges (male enrollment of 2,500 or less) enjoy an ROTC participation level of ten percent of the male undergraduate student body while the larger colleges (male enrollment of 5,000 or more) enjoy an ROTC participation level of only 1.53 percent. Further, the small colleges have a total ROTC enrollment of about 16,000 while the large colleges only have a total ROTC enrollment of approximately 12,000. If the Army thoroughly investigated the productivity levels of large and small colleges that sponsored ROTC, the cost-effectiveness of ROTC units at large colleges might be disturbingly low. Examination of productivity by college size; however, could provide the Army with valuable information regarding the establishment of future ROTC units. The evidence appears to confirm that ROTC enrollment is inversely proportional to the size of the college and that establishing more ROTC units at small colleges might reap considerable benefits.

What, then, does the ROTC annual goal through 1982, recent ROTC production results, declining college enrollment and relative levels of ROTC participation appear to indicate?

These factors appear to confirm that ROTC planned goals might be too high and that the current location of ROTC units probably does not maximize production. The total projected male undergraduate population however, appears to indicate that there is an ample supply of potential officer program members. If there are more than enough potential officers, a solution to maximizing production is to thoroughly recruit from that segment of the college population that is, at present, only marginally covered.

CCP Production Potential

CCP could primarily recruit from non-Army ROTC colleges and secondarily recruit from Army ROTC colleges. The secondary recruiting effort could be directed at students who were unable to participate in ROTC because of job or academic commitments. The full-time male undergraduate population at only non-Army ROTC colleges indicates that CCP could produce at least 3,300 new officers each year and if any effort were made at ROTC colleges, total production might well exceed 4,000 in any given year. Production of this magnitude would equal nearly twenty-five percent of the total annual Army officer procurement requirement through 1982. Further, production that consistently exceeded 3,000 officers per year could substantially reduce the ROTC burden and lessen the overall risk of failure.

It does not appear that the ROTC production requirement is risky until 1979; however, the current production plan seems to increase the risk of failure after that year, particularly during 1980-1981. The classes of 1980 and 1981 are probably crucial to the decision to implement CCP. By 1978 both classes must be in college and the Army should review planned ROTC enrollment for these classes against the actual enrollment. Should one or both of these classes be below the planned ROTC enrollment level, then CCP implementation merits serious consideration. Since CCP would probably be an undergraduate program, it would not be possible for the program to increase overall program enrollment in the class of 1980 unless it was started by 1978.

The decision to implement CCP in 1978, or any other year, might provide the Army with a vehicle to support the officer requirement for the Total Force. The reserve components must be maintained and the Army production plan indicates that well over one-third of total officer production is earmarked for the Army Reserve or the National Guard. Should CCP be implemented, it could produce officers exclusively for the reserve components or provide a mixture of active duty reserve officers and reserve component officers. Further, the cost of manning the Total Force officer structure could be substantially less than current costs.

Fiscal Considerations

CCP should be a relatively inexpensive source of officers when both individual and estimated total program costs are compared to existing programs. CCP possesses the potential to become the Army's second largest officer procurement program and the least expensive of all Army programs. It is not inconceivable that CCP could produce approximately fifty percent of FY 1979 projected ROTC production at one-third of the anticipated ROTC costs. CCP should be able to produce Army officers at nearly $3,000.00 per officer less than ROTC and $12,000.00 per officer less than the ROTC scholarship program. The potential savings from starting a CCP within the next two or three years could be as high as 20-30 million dollars annually and still realize the overall Army production goal. If CCP were implemented, it could drive total Army officer production costs down by reducing ROTC program costs. This could be accomplished by eliminating the least productive and, therefore, the most expensive, ROTC units. If ROTC overall costs were reduced by elimination of nonproductive ROTC units and the cheaper CCP started to supplement more efficient ROTC production, it is difficult to conceive of a situation that would not permit overall cost reduction. There is; however, a cautionary note regarding current cost comparison procedures.

Comparative cost is a criteria that should probably be reviewed by the Department of Defense. Each military service appears to be assigning or estimating costs for officer programs without concrete guidance. This lack of guidance has resulted in a somewhat chaotic situation that permitted a Department of Defense Office to report one cost figure to the Office of Management and Budget[1] and another cost figure on the same program to the U.S. Senate[2] in a period of sixty days that differed by nearly $7,000.00 per graduate. William F. Snyder discussed officer program costs in his essay, "Leaders for the Volunteer Force: The Problems and Prospects of ROTC" by asserting that cost was biased in favor of ROTC and that the bias was substantial when ROTC was compared to the service academies and slightly biased in favor of ROTC when it was compared to OCS programs. The academies were compelled to report both educational and military training expenses while ROTC costs included only a small fraction of educational expenses. He argued that both academy and OCS graduates received more military training than the ROTC officer and that academy graduates remained on active duty longer than the ROTC officer. Mr. Snyder concluded by stating that Army ROTC officers were very costly when compared to OCS produced officers.[3]

The Department of the Army "Departmental Staffing of ITRO Study on Efficiency" of November 1976, recommended that a means of common costing was needed by the Department of Defense so that there would be no question about the cost of recruiting programs.[4] Specific common guidelines would probably solve some of the problems that surround cost comparisons in general and the CCP cost question in particular.

Career Retention

CCP source officers will probably experience a retention rate of between fifteen and thirty percent after ten years of commissioned service. The ultimate retention rate will be affected by the manpower management practices of the Army;

however, if the ROTC retention rate of fifteen percent and the PLC retention rate of twenty-eight percent are averaged, the result is 21.5 percent. Based upon an estimated cost of $10,231 per officer and a retention rate of about twenty percent, CCP would be the most inexpensive source of career officers available to the Army. Since there appears to be a substantial market for CCP and the program could be the most inexpensive source of officers in terms of cost and career retention, what problems or limitations could be expected?

Potential CCP Limitations

The most obvious probable limitation is that CCP might not produce 4,500-5,000 officers each year. Whether this possible limitation is so serious that it overrides all other considerations is a question that the Army must answer. The Army planned production requirement of 4,500-5,000 CCP source officers might require re-evaluation. Perhaps the most pressing issue is not the planned requirement, but the ability of a CCP to supplement ROTC production and, therefore, provide insurance against potential failure.

A second potential limitation to implementing CCP is the necessity to establish a recruiting and administrative management structure. It is probably unrealistic to expect the current ROTC instructor groups to manage two programs simultaneously. The ROTC instructors may be able to recruit on their campuses and even some adjacent campuses; however, it is unlikely that these officers could intensely cover over 1,400 campuses and still accomplish their primary ROTC mission. A more reasonable approach might be to determine how many CCP recruiting officers would be necessary if a separate recruiting system was established.

It would probably be unwise to determine the total number of procurement officers required based solely upon the number of colleges where recruiting was contemplated. A more accurate method of determining the total number of recruiters is probably to compare the CCP annual production requirement against Marine Corps PLC and Officer Candidate Class historical production per officer selection officer. During the past six years there have been approximately 115 officer selection officers recruiting for the PLC and Officer Candidate Class Program. These officers have annually provided about 1,500 PLC/OCC source officers, or a ratio of one recruiting officer per twelve officers produced. In view of this information, it appears that the Army would need 375 procurement officers to produce 4,500 CCP source officers annually. A key question; however, would be the placement of the recruiting apparatus.

The Army enlisted recruiting structure does not now lend itself to CCP recruiting, but it is somewhat similar to the Marine Corps officer/enlisted recruiting system. Figure 5-1 shows the Army enlisted and Marine officer/enlisted recruiting systems.

Figure 5-1

Army Enlisted System[5]	Marine System[6]
U.S. Army Recruiting Command	Marine Corps Recruitment Branch
Army Regions (5)	Marine Corps Districts (6)
District Recruiting Commands	Recruiting Stations
Recruiting Area Headquarters	(No Marine Counterpart)
Recruiting Station (Enlisted Recruiters)	Officer Selection Offices/ Recruiting Substations

There is a possibility that a CCP recruiting apparatus could be established within the Army enlisted structure by allocating managers at the Recruiting Command and Army Region level and placing the actual CCP recruiters in the Recruiting Areas or assigning CCP/OCS selection officers on an equal level with the enlisted recruiters. There are probably a number of solutions to establishing a CCP recruiting system (placing recruiters directly under the Training and Doctrine Command or centralized management from Headquarters, Department of the Army) but the important point is that the existing ROTC structure probably could not effectively manage and recruit for the program.

The most serious potential limitation to CCP is one that cannot be measured: commitment. CCP is an alternative solution to potential Army officer procurement problems; however, if the Army decides to start a CCP, the recruiting and management apparatus should be totally committed to program success and the Army Staff should be totally supportive. CCP should not be viewed as potentially destructive to ROTC or as another "Gee Whiz" idea that just won't work. If the Army should decide to enter the CCP market with less than total commitment, the program will probably fail in relatively short order regardless of the size of the potential market.

Areas of Potential Future Investigation

There does not appear to be an immediate requirement to implement CCP. Since the potential critical ROTC production period is at least three years away, the Army has an opportunity to further examine the CCP concept and assess ROTC enrollment and production levels. The key point is that the next sixteen to thirty-six months should not be spent ignoring the possibilites of a CCP while attempting to secure additional ROTC scholarships from a fiscally tough-minded Congress. The latter course of action, to put it bluntly, is probably wishful thinking. There are potentially good solutions, other than ROTC scholarship increases, to procurement and production problems. The Army has a short "breathing period" to objectively examine CCP and any other production alternatives that might have been recently developed. The Army's previous excellent record in developing and instituting personnel management programs and its ability to responsibly manage a thirty billion dollar budget appears to indicate that the time spent between the present and some future CCP implementation date will not be wasted.

In the final analysis, CCP may very well provide the Army planners with the ability to efficiently manage overall officer procurement rather than simply react to production crises after the damage is irreversible.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Based on official correspondence between Mr. Richard A. Wiley, Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, and the Honorable James T. Lynn, Director, Office of Management and Budget, March 11, 1976.

[2] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Marine Corps Platoon Leaders Class, Hearing, 94th Congress, 2nd Sess., June 3, 1976 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 7.

[3] William P. Snyder, "Leaders for the Volunteer Force: the Problems and Prospects of ROTC," The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S., ed. Lawrence J. Korb (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1976), p. 83.

[4] Richard S. Sweet, BGen, U.S. Army, "Departmental Staffing of ITRO Study on Efficiency" (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 11, 1976), pp. 6-7.

[5] Based on an interview between Major Todd Starbuck, U.S. Army and Major Phillip E. Tucker, USMC, on March 13, 1977, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

[6] Department of Defense, Military Personnel Procurement Manual, (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, June 2, 1972), pp. 1-3 - 1-4.

APPENDIX A

PLC PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

Table 1 provides PLC Reserve and Regular Accessions from 1970 through 1976. PLC accessions are also compared against total Marine Corps reserve accessions and regular accessions. This information confirms the PLC contribution during the most recent six year period. A considerable amount of care must be exercised in assessing the value of this data. For example, FY 1976 appears to indicate a rather substantial production decline; however, in fact the number of regular commissions increased and FY 76 Officer Basic Classes, which are limited to a specific number of spaces, were filled by regular officers. Therefore, the PLC Commissionee was required to wait until FY 7T, or in most cases FY 77, to become an accession. What appears to be a substantial decrease in production was actually a management decision to defer PLC officers until Officer Basic Class spaces became available.

Table 1

PLC Reserve and Regular Accessions[1]

FY	PLC USMCR Acc.	PLC USMC Acc.	Total USMCR Acc.	Total USMC Acc.	Total
1970	812	18	2,592	497	3,089
1971	670	55	1,613	409	2,022
1972	502	10	1,436	327	1,763

Table 1 (Continued)

FY	PLC USMCR Acc.	PLC USMC Acc.	Total USMCR Acc.	Total USMC Acc.	Total
1973	619	*0	1,635	627	2,262
1974	606	*0	1,417	510	1,927
1975	835	*0	1,760	560	2,320
1976	565	*0	1,364	744	2,108
Total	4,609	83	11,817	3,674	15,491

*PLC Regular Commissions Discontinued

Table 2 confirms PLC production over the last twenty-five years and indicates the heavily oriented active duty reserve nature of PLC. This data confirms that, with the exception of two years (1955 and 1956), PLC production has not exceeded 1,000 or been less than approximately 400. The large classes of 1955-1956 were probably generated by program quotas during the Korean War and were not the result of some aberration which produced extremely low attrition.

Table 2

Total PLC Reserve and Regular Accessions
Fiscal Years 1952-1976[2]

FY	PLC Reserve Accessions	PLC Regular Accessions	Total
1952	398	0	398
1953	680	0	680

Table 2 (Continued)

FY	PLC Reserve Accessions	PLC Regular Accessions	Total
1954	970	20	990
1955	1,450	14	1,466
1956	1,084	14	1,098
1957	522	26	548
1958	574	18	592
1959	558	23	581
1960	560	25	585
1961	554	25	579
1962	553	34	587
1963	507	41	548
1964	673	40	713
1965	835	29	864
1966	472	35	507
1967	356	58	414
1968	855	74	929
1969	859	34	893
1970	812	18	830
1971	670	55	725
1972	502	10	512
1973	619	0	619
1974	606	0	606
1975	835	0	835
1976	565	0	565

Table 3

FY 1975-1976 Production in the Officer Candidate Class Program

FY	Rpt to Training	Commissioned	Attrition Percentage
76	909	658	27.5[3]
75	1,191	722	39.4[4]

Table 4

PLC Applications by Fiscal Year 1968-1975[5]

FY	Quota	Selected	% of Quota Selected
1968	2,200	2,135	97.1
1969	2,200	1,695	77.2
1970	2,300	1,657	72.04
1971	2,200	1,900	86.36
1972	2,200	2,347	106.68
1973	2,200	2,343	106.5
1974	2,200	2,482	112,81
1975	2,254	2,515	111.57

Table 5 projects PLC Summer Training attendance over the next two fiscal years and, based upon an eight year summer training attrition percentage, projects the number who should complete training.

Table 5

Projected PLC Summer Training Attendance[6] Fiscal Years 1977-1978

FY	Projected Reporting	Projected Completing
1977	3,150	*2,520
1978	3,150	*2,520

* Derived by using 20% attrition factor based on historical data in Table 6.

Table 6

PLC Summer Training Results by Fiscal Year 1969-1975

FY	Reported	Completed	Attrition	Completion Percentage
1969	1,895	1,722	173	90.87
1970	1,842	1,564	278	84.91
1971	2,045	1,668	377	81.56
1972	2,563	2,012	551	78.5
1973	2,352	1,791	561	76.15
1974	2,509	2,002	507	79.79
1975	2,732	2,259	473	82.68
Total	15,938	13,018	2,920	81.68

Sources:

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Reserve Officer Candidate Enrollment Report FY 75," (Washington, D.C., 1975).

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "PLC Summer Training Results 1975," (Washington, D.C., 1975).

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Platoon Leaders Class Senior Course Summer of 1974," (Washington, D.C., 1974).

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Calendar Year 1973 Summer Training Results," (Washington, D.C., 1973).

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Platoon Leaders Class Senior Course Summer of 1972," (Washington, D.C., 1972).

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Platoon Leaders Class Combined and Junior Course Summer of 1972," (Washington, D.C., 1972).

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Reserve Officer Candidate Enrollment Report FY 72," (Washington, D.C., 1972).

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Platoon Leaders Class FY 71," (Washington, D.C., 1971).

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Platoon Leaders Class Senior Course Summer of 1971," (Washington, D.C., 1971).

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Platoon Leaders Class Junior and Combined Course Summer of 1971," (Washington, D.C., 1971).

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Platoon Leaders Class Senior Course Summer of 1970," (Washington, D.C., 1970).

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Platoon Leaders Class Junior Course Summer of 1970," (Washington, D.C., 1970).

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Platoon Leaders Class Senior Course Summer of 1969," (Washington, D.C., 1969).

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Platoon Leaders Class Junior Course Summer of 1969," (Washington, D.C., 1969).

Table 7 shows PLC production over a four year period by identifying cumulative PLC enrollment in four recent graduating classes. Recruiting for the Class of 1972 (FY 72) commenced in September 1968, and terminated in June 1971. The cumulative enrollment over that three year period was 1,749 of which 512 were accessed in FY 72, hence, the precommissioning retention of the Class of 1972 was approximately 30 percent. The data for the remaining three classes, while showing a slight upward trend, is fairly constant. It is important to note that the first class to have the stipend available for the entire period was the Class of 1975 and its retention rate was over four percent higher than the Class of 1972.

Table 7

4 Year (FY 72-75) Cumulative PLC Enrollment Vs. Accessions (Intraprogram Retention)[7]

FY	Cumulative Enrollment	Accessed	Percentage
1972	1,749	512	29.27
1973	1,970	619	31.42
1974	2,011	606	30.13
1975	2,489	835	33.54
Total	8,219	2,572	31.29

Table 8

Cost Per PLC Commission Based on FY 1975 Costs[8]

Item	Cost
Recruiting Cost	$ 1,963.00
Active Duty (Training) Salary	650.00
Maximum Stipend	2,700.00
Training, Travel, Admin. Costs	6,600.00
Total	$11,913.00

Table 9 shows actual PLC stipend participants from FY 72-76 and projects stipend participants through FY 80. Stipend expenditures are obtained by multiplying $900.00 times the total number of participants for a particular fiscal year. Appropriations for the Financial Assistance Program are based upon $900.00 per participant; however, it is unlikely that the total appropriation would ever be spent since a few participants will be mid-year graduates who are ineligible for the entire $900.00 and other participants may be forced to drop out of college, hence, those individuals would be ineligible for further payment. The projections are approximate and are predicated upon the continued growth which PLC has exhibited over the past four years.

Table 9

Maximum Total PLC Program Stipend Expenditures Fiscal Years 1972-1976 and Projected Stipend Participation through Fiscal Year 1980[9]

FY	Stipend Participants	Stipend Expenditures
1972	444	$ 399,600.00
1973	701	630,900.00
1974	911	819,900.00
1975	963	866,700.00
1976	1,022	919,800.00
1977	*1,100	*990,000.00
1978	*1,200	*1,080,000.00
1979	*1,300	*1,170,000.00
1980	*1,400	*1,260,000.00

* Projected

Table 10 shows Marine Corps recruiting results for stipend payment within the PLC Program since Public Law 92-172 was signed in November 1972. FY 1972 stipend recruiting was incomplete for the reason stated below. The data confirms that a relatively constant percentage of the eligible inventory has elected to participate in the Financial Assistance Program (stipend).

Table 10

PLC Stipend Recruiting Results
Fiscal Year 1972-1976[10]

FY	Selected	Est. Total Eligible	% of Eligible Inventory
1972*	444	2,022	21.95
1973	701	2,065	34.43
1974	911	2,500	36.44
1975	963	2,700	35.66
1976	1,022	2,900	35.24

*PL 92-172 was not signed by the President until November 1971; hence recruiting did not commence until November and the application deadline was 31 January 1972. In subsequent years, applications were received from 1 September - 31 January.

Table 11

PLC Production Percentages Fiscal Year 1970-1976 Vs. Total USMC Accessions and Total Accessions[11]

FY	% PLC Production Vs. USMCR Accessions	% PLC Production Vs. JSMC/ USMCR Total Accessions
1970	31.33	26.87
1971	41.54	35.85
1972	34.96	29.04
1973	37.86	27.36
1974	42.77	31.45
1975	47.44	36
1976	41.42	26.8
Total	39	29.75

The profile indicated in Table 12 shows what the Marine Corps believes to be an "ideal year" in terms of production of officers. In view of the percent of PLC contribution to total Marine Corps accessions over the past seven years it becomes evident that PLC is not reaching the conceptualized goal. In fact, although PLC attrition was lower in 1975 than it was in 1972, the Marine Corps still has a considerable distance to cover before PLC produces its share of the total accession goal.

Table 12

Profile: Marine Officer Procurement--"Ideal Year"[12]

Program	Ideal Year Desired % of Total Production
Naval Programs (USNA-NROTC)	20
PLC	58
Officer Candidate Class	10
Woman Officer Candidate Class	2
Active Duty Programs	10

Table 13 indicates what percent of total accessions PLC has produced over the past seven years and, using the 58 percent conceptualized goal, what the PLC contribution would have been to attain the goal.

Table 13

PLC Percentage of Total Accessions Fiscal Years 1970-1976

FY	Actual PLC Production	Total Production	What "Ideal" Production Should Have Been Attained	Actual % of "Ideal" Production Attained
1970	830	3,089	1,792	46.3
1971	725	2,022	1,173	61.8
1972	512	1,763	1,023	50.04
1973	619	2,262	1,312	47.2
1974	606	1,927	1,118	54.2

Table 13 (Continued)

FY	Actual PLC Production	Total Production	What "Ideal" Production Should Have Been Attained	Actual % of "Ideal" Production Attained
1975	835	2,320	1,346	62
1976	565	2,108	1,223	46.2

Table 14

Retention Rates of Comparative Army, Navy and Marine Corps Service Commissioning Programs (Officers on Active Duty Between 10 and 20 Years of Commissioned Service)

Program	Retention Rate %
U.S. Military Academy	62[13]
U.S. Naval Academy	61.5[14]
ROTC RA DMG	42.2[15]
ROTC RA Scholarship	40.1[16]
NROTC Scholarship	34.6[17]
ROTC OBV IV (Scholarship)	29.8[18]
PLC	27.5[19]
ROTC OBV III (Flip)	24.9[20]
Marine Corps OCS	21.8[21]
NROTC (Contract)	19.7[22]
ROTC OBV II	14.8[23]
Army OCS	5.8[24]

Graph 1 PLC Summer Training Results FY 69-75



Table 3 (Continued)

College	Male Enrollment	Male ROTC Enrollment	Percentage
W. Ill. U.	6,910	139	2.01
Wheaton	990	255	25.76
Ind. Tech.	314	41	13.06
U. of Ind.	12,503	136	1.09
Purdue	14,123	101	.72
Rose-Hulman Tech.	1,022	559	54.7
Notre Dame	5,408	161	2.98
E. Ky. U.	4,513	1,337	29.63
Morehead	2,705	228	8.43
Murray St.	3,468	141	4.07
U. of Ky.	9,402	118	1.26
W. Ky. U.	5,383	251	4.66
Cent. Mich.	6,497	112	1.72
E. Mich.	6,754	100	1.48
Mich. St.	18,084	92	.51
Mich. Tech.	5,326	152	2.85
No. Mich. U.	3,343	82	2.45
U. of Det.	1,760	52	2.95
U. of Mich.	11,609	54	.47
W. Mich. U.	8,959	87	.97
Cent. Misso. St. Col	3,290	168	5.11
Kemper	57	54	94.74
Lincoln U.	1,186	275	23.19
Mo. Western	1,324	40	3.02

Table 3 (Continued)

College	Male Enrollment	Male ROTC Enrollment	Percentage
NE Mo. St.	2,186	275	12.58
U. of Wisc. (Platteville)	2,562	155	6.05
U. of Wisc. (S.P.)	4,351	94	2.16
U. of Wisc. (Whitewater)	3,107	87	2.8
Ala. A&M	1,636	531	32.45
Auburn	8,989	138	1.54
Jacksonville	2,884	281	9.74
Marion Inst.	179	147	82.12
Tuskegee	1,595	113	7.08
U. of Ala.	7,008	338	4.82
U. of No. Ala.	1,835	121	6.59
U. of So. Ala.	3,000	105	3.5
Ark. Tech.	1,205	116	9.63
Ark. St.	3,023	130	4.30
Henderson St.	1,424	107	7.51
Ouachita Bap.	731	254	34.75
Southern St.	841	84	9.99
U. of Cent. Ark.	1,817	99	5.27
U. of Ark.	5,685	92	1.62
U. of Ark (Pine Bluff)	1,176	379	32.22
Kan. St. (Pitt.)	1,804	103	5.71
KSU	7,393	89	1.20

Table 3 (Continued)

College	Male Enrollment	Male ROTC Enrollment	Percentage
U. of Ks.	8,493	92	1.08
Wichita St.	3,730	39	1.05
LSU	10,164	111	1.09
Loyola of the So.	1,130	102	9.03
McNeese St.	2,534	104	4.10
Nicholls St.	2,910	44	1.51
NE La.	4,787	179	3.74
NW St. U.	2,580	82	3.18
SE La.	2,758	114	4.13
Southern U.	3,902	65	1.67
Tulane	2,898	79	2.73
Alcorn St.	1,279	121	9.46
Jackson St.	2,411	181	7.51
U. of Az.	10,387	134	1.29
Cal. Poly.	8,002	164	2.05
Claremont	1,534	100	6.52
San Jose St.	11,496	81	.70
U. of Cal (Berk)	12,075	96	.79
U. of Cal (Davis)	6,127	205	3.35
UCLA	11,351	104	.92
U of Cal (S.B.)	6,363	62	.97
U. of SF	1,318	71	5.39
U. of Santa Clara	2,006	70	3.49

Table 3 (Continued)

College	Male Enrollment	Male ROTC Enrollment	Percentage
Col. Sch. of Mines	1,765	506	28.67
Col. St. U.	7,476	107	1.43
U. of So. Col.	2,430	145	5.97
U. of Col.	10,054	91	.90
U. of Hawaii	8,345	130	1.56
Id. St. U.	1,884	99	5.25
U. of Id.	3,609	130	3.6
Ia. St. U.	10,827	99	.91
U. of Ia.	7,606	74	.97
St. John's	1,670	82	4.91
U. of Minn.	17,867	92	.51
Mt. St. U.	4,556	120	2.63
U. of Mt.	4,348	71	1.63
Creighton	1,450	63	4.34
Kearney St.	1,833	125	6.82
U. of Neb.	9,403	85	.90
U. of Nev. (Reno)	2,946	405	13.75
No. Dak. St.	3,512	89	2.53
U. of No. Dak.	3,619	84	2.32
Ore. St. U.	8,436	88	1.04
U. of Ore.	6,972	40	.57
So. Dak. M&T	1,045	93	8.9
So. Dak. St.	3,235	133	4.11
U. of So. Dak.	2,358	305	12.93

Table 3 (Continued)

College	Male Enrollment	Male ROTC Enrollment	Percentage
Miss. St.	6,062	321	5.30
U. of Miss.	3,596	192	5.34
U. of So. Miss.	4,041	484	11.98
E. NM St. U.	1,743	146	8.38
NMMI	421	343	81.48
NM St. U.	4,498	83	1.85
Cameron	2,703	93	3.44
Cent. St. U.	5,364	62	1.16
E. Cent. Ok. St.	1,359	68	5.00
NW St. Col.	754	39	5.17
Ok St. U.	10,514	181	1.72
SW St. Col.	2,171	84	3.87
U. of Ok.	8,141	83	1.02
Bishop	837	198	23.65
Hardin-Simmons	752	77	10.25
Midwestern	1,548	86	5.55
Prarie View	1,980	736	37.17
Rice	1,800	59	3.28
St. Mary's	1,352	103	7.62
Sam Houston St.	4,528	81	1.79
S.F. Austin St.	4,591	82	1.79
Tarleton St.	1,507	135	8.96
Texas A&I	2,570	80	3.11
Texas A&M	14,531	586	4.03

Table 3 (Continued)

College	Male Enrollment	Male ROTC Enrollment	Percentage
TCU	1,819	45	2.47
Texas Tech.	10,930	100	.91
Trinity	1,338	113	8.45
Houston	8,074	96	1.19
U. of Texas (Arl)	9,330	111	1.19
U. of Texas	19,182	90	.47
UTEP	5,541	148	2.67
W. Texas St. U.	2,465	61	2.47
U. of Alaska	1,627	30	1.84
ASU	13,461	236	1.75
BYU	10,796	361	3.34
U. of Utah	9,320	118	1.26
Utah St.	4,481	81	1.80
Weber St.	4,086	67	1.64
E. Wash. St.	3,194	96	3.0
Gonzaga	856	97	11.33
Seattle	1,064	49	4.6
U. of Wash.	13,723	97	.71
WSU	7,482	104	1.39
U. of Wy.	3,799	58	1.53

Table 4

ROTC Participation by College Size

Size	Total Male Undergraduates	Total Male ROTC	Percentage
More than 5,000	804,265	12,324	1.53
2500-5000	251,569	9,953	3.96
Less than 2,500	167,720	16,799	10.016
Total	1,223,554	39,076	3.19

Table 5

Undergraduate and First Professional Degree Enrollment in All Institutions of Higher Education By Sex and Attendance Status (1975-1982)[3] (In Thousands)

Year	Men	Women	Full-Time	Part-Time
1975	4,189	3,444	5,431	2,202
1976	4,259	3,513	5,517	2,255
1977	4,322	3,577	5,595	2,304
1978	4,362	3,621	5,647	2,336
1979	4,366	3,635	5,653	2,348
1980	4,353	3,638	5,637	2,354
1981	4,322	3,621	5,597	2,346
1982	4,253	3,578	5,525	2,305

Table 6

Summary of Enrollment in All Institutions of Higher Education By Degree Credit (2 year or 4 year) 1975-1982[4] (In Thousands)

Year	4 Year Degree	2 Year Degree
1975	6,638	2,007
1976	6,724	2,087
1977	6,811	2,154
1978	6,862	2,207
1979	6,861	2,255
1980	6,842	2,261
1981	6,790	2,261
1982	6,684	2,243

Table 7

Estimated Percentage of Full-Time Male Enrollment In Four Year and Two Year Academic Disciplines 1975-1982 (In Thousands)

Year	%	4 Year Degree	2 Year Degree
1975	54.66	(2969)	(1097)
1976	54.79	(3023)	(1143)
1977	54.72	(3062)	(1179)
1978	54.64	(3086)	(1206)
1979	54.57	(3085)	(1221)
1980	54.47	(3070)	(1228)
1981	54.41	(3045)	(1230)
1982	54.31	(3000)	(1218)

Derived from Table 5 "Full-Time" column using the male percentage of total enrollment (54.5%).

Table 8

Estimated Male Enrollment at ROTC Universities and Non-ROTC Universities Using SY 1975-1976 As the Base Year (In Thousands)*

Year	ROTC Universities	Non-ROTC Universities
1975	1,224	1,745
1976	1,246	1,777
1977	1,262	1,800
1978	1,272	1,814
1979	1,272	1,813
1980	1,265	1,805
1981	1,255	1,790
1982	1,237	1,763

*41.22 percent of all undergraduate males in 1975-76 were located on campuses which offered ROTC.

Table 9

Projected ROTC Retention Levels; Classes of 1978 and 1979[5]

Class	MSI	MSII	MSIII	MSIV	Accessed	Retention Percentage
1978	21,171	9,808	7,594	7,944	7,563	35.72
1979	26,395	11,624	10,060	9,426	7,913	29.97

Average Retention Percentage: .33

Table 10

Number of Institutions of Higher Education By Size and Degree Status[6] (1972)

Size	Number	(In Thousands) Enrollment	4 Yr	(Thousands) 4 Year Enrollment	2 Yr	(Thousands) 2 Year Enrollment
Less Than 2,500	1,851	1,618	1,181	1,004	670	614
2500-5000	328	1,161	185	652	143	509
Greater Than 5,000	486	6,436	335	4,893	151	1,543

*Growth factor of college enrollment from 1972 to 1975: 6%.[7]

**Proportion of male to female college enrollment: 54.5 : 45.5.

***1975 percentage of full-time to part-time students: 71%.

Table 11

Estimated 1975 Enrollment by Size of College and Degree Status (In Thousands)

Size	Total Enrollment	4 Year Degree	2 Year Degree
Less Than 2,500	1,715	1,064	651
2,500-5,000	1,231	691	540
Over 5,000	6,822	5,187	1,635

Table 12

Estimated Male Full-Time Enrollment By Size of College and Degree Status (1975)

Size	Total F.T. Male Enrollment	4 Year Degree	2 Year Degree
Less than 2,500	664	412	252
2500-5000	476	267	209
Over 5,000	2,640	2,007	633

Table 13

Number of ROTC Universities by Size and Male Enrollment As Compared with Non-ROTC Universities by Size And Male Enrollment (1975) (4 Year Degree Only) (Not Necessarily Full-Time) (In Thousands)

Size	ROTC Univ	Male Enrollment	Non-ROTC Univ	Est. Male Enrollment
Less Than 2,500	120	168	1,061	458
2500-5000	71	252	114	79
Over 5,000	86	804	249	2,023

Table 14

Estimated Full-Time Male Enrollment on Campuses Where ROTC is Not Hosted by Size *(Using 71% of the Student Population as Full-Time) (In Thousands)

Size	Full-Time Male Enrollment
Less Than 2,500	0325
2,500-5,000	0042 (0056) - (0014)

Table 14 (Continued)

Size	Full-Time Male Enrollment
Over 5,000	1436

*Deduct 14,000 for 3 academy enrollments.

Table 15

Interest in CCP Affiliation by Size of College Based on Factors of ROTC Interest and Eligibility (Male Only)

Size	Interest and Eligibility Factor		Total Interested and Eligible Population
Less Than 2,500	(Same as ROTC)	(10%)	32,500
2500-5000	(Same as ROTC)	(3.96%)	1,663
Over 5,000	(Same as ROTC)	(1.53%)	21,971
Total		(3.19%)	56,134

Table 16

1975 Percentage of College Students by Academic Class[8]

Freshmen:	30%	(0545)
Sophomors:	23%	(0418)
Juniors:	24%	(0436)
Seniors:	23%	(0418)

Table 17

Percentage of Male ROTC Participation By Academic Class[9] (1975)

Freshman:	51%
Sophomores:	20%
Juniors:	15%
Seniors:	14%

Table 18

Level of Probable Male Participation in CCP By Class And Size of College at Colleges Where ROTC is Not Located (Same Interest Level as ROTC)

Size	Academic Class	CCP Population
Less Than 2,500	Freshmen (51%)	16,575
	Sophomores (20%)	6,500
	Juniors (15%)	4,875
	Seniors (14%)	4,550
2,500-5,000	Freshmen	848
	Sophomores	333
	Juniors	249
	Seniors	233
Over 5,000	Freshmen	11,205
	Sophomores	4,394
	Juniors	3,296
	Seniors	3,076

Table 18 (Continued)

Size	Academic Class	CCP Population
Total	Freshmen	28,628
	Sophomores	11,227
	Juniors	8,420
	Seniors	7,859

* Percentage of Beginning MS IV Enrollment that is accessed (Based on 1975 figures: 85%) (Derived from FY 75 Beginning MS IV enrollment and actual FY 75 ROTC accessions (4,149 of 4,892)

Percentage of CCP seniors who could expect to be accessed: 6,680.

The following tables are based upon male projected participation levels at different size non-ROTC colleges and universities which are less than ROTC levels. The lower participation levels are projected based on less campus visibility than ROTC and the experience of the Marine Corps in PLC recruiting at colleges where ROTC is not hosted.

Table 19

Participation Factor of .66 of ROTC at 4 Year Colleges with Less than 2,500 Male Students

Class	Factor	Projected Participation
Total	6.66	21,645
Freshmen	6.66	(11,039)
Sophomores	6.66	(4,329)
Juniors	6.66	(3,247)
Seniors	6.66	(3,030)
Accessions	6.66	2,576

Table 19 (Continued)

Participation Factor of .50 of ROTC at 4 Year Colleges with Less than 2,500 Male Enrollment

Class	Factor	Projected Participation
Total	5.0	16,250
Freshmen	5.0	(8,288)
Sophomores	5.0	(3,250)
Juniors	5.0	(2,437)
Seniors	5.0	(2,275)
Accessions		1,934

Participation Factor of .66 of ROTC at 4 Year Colleges with Between 2,500 and 5,000 Male Students

Class	Factor	Projected Participation
Total	2.61	1,096
Freshmen	2.61	(559)
Sophomores	2.61	(219)
Juniors	2.61	(164)
Seniors	2.61	(154)
Accessions	2.61	130

Participation Factor of .50 of ROTC at 4 Year Colleges with Between 2,500 and 5,000 Male Students

Class	Factor	Projected Participation
Total	1.98	832
Freshmen	1.98	(424)
Sophomores	1.98	(166)
Juniors	1.98	(125)
Seniors	1.98	(117)
Accessions		99

Table 19 (Continued)

Participation Factor of .66 of ROTC at 4 Year Colleges with over 5,000 Male Students

Class	Factor	Projected Participation
Total	1.0	14,360
Freshmen	1.0	(7,324)
Sophomores	1.0	(2,872)
Juniors	1.0	(2,154)
Seniors	1.0	(2,010)
Accessions	1.0	1,709

Participation Factor of .50 of ROTC at 4 Year Colleges with over 5,000 Male Students

Class	Factor	Projected Participation
Total	.77	11,057
Freshmen	.77	(5,639)
Sophomores	.77	(2,211)
Juniors	.77	(1,659)
Seniors	.77	(1,548)
Accessions		1,316

Table 20

Projected CCP Total Accessions from Non-ROTC Colleges by Factor of the ROTC Participation Level

Participation Level	Projected Annual Accessions
Same as ROTC	6,680
.66 of ROTC	4,415
.50 of ROTC	3,349

Table 20 (Continued)

Probable Accuracy of Different Participation Levels:

CCP Participation Level Same as ROTC: 10%

CCP Participation Level .66 of ROTC: 40%

CCP Participation Level .50 of ROTC: 50%

Probable Number of CCP Accessions Based on Weighted Average Levels: 4,109

Table 21

The PLC Experience in Procurement and Retention As It Could Relate to CCP

Requirement	PLC Historical Procurement % By Class	Procurement to Accession Retention %	Procurement	Annual Accessions
5,000	Freshmen: 41% of quota	30%	16,700	5,012
	Sophomore: 32% of quota		Freshmen (6847) Sophomore(5344) Junior (4509)	
	Junior: 27% of quota			

Total Male Full-Time Undergraduate Enrollment at Non-ROTC Colleges and Universities by Class: 1,817,000 (See Table 16)

Class	Size	Annual CCP Requirement	%
Freshmen	545,000	6,847	1.26
Sophomore	418,000	5,344	1.28
Junior	436,000	4,509	1.03

Table 22

A Hypothetical Total Male Undergraduate Class From the Freshmen Through Junior Year at Non-ROTC Universities as Compared to the CCP Total Requirement for this Class.

(See Table 16)

Average Male Strength of the Class During the 3 Year Period	Total Requirement	% Required For CCP
466,000	16,700	3.58

Table 23

Collegiate Commissioning Program Estimated Costs (Army Estimate)[10]

Assumptions:

a. ROTC officer production will be limited to that necessary to meet Active Force requirements (FY 77 PBD #5 and #128).

b. Collegiate Precommissioning Program (CCP) would be the primary source of officer production to offset shortfalls generated by ROTC Program constraints.

c. Production requirements will approximate 4,500-5,000 annually.

Program Flow/Related Costs

Phase I - Recruiting (not included in cost per graduate)

Recruiting/Advertising costs - $1,913 per accession.

Accession recruiting costs estimated from comparison of PLC accession cost ($2,693.89) and enlisted accession cost ($1,132) @ $1,913 per year.

Phase II - Enlistment in USAR

AFEES cost included in cost per accession above.

Cost include: Lodging, food, medical, testing, travel, administration.

Table 23 (Continued)

Phase III - First Summer Camp

Based on BCT cost - FY 75. Adjust for E5. Total = $3,468.

Phase IV - Reserve Unit Affiliation

$100 @ month subsistence 10 months = $1,000

Correspondence Courses = 68

Total $1,068

Phase V - Second Summer Camp

$2,247 - Based on cost of ROTC summer camp.

Phase VI - Reserve Unit Affiliation

$100 @ month subsistance 10 months = $1,000

Correspondence Courses = 68

Total $1,068

Phase VII - Added Personnel Costs

0-1 over 2 = $746.35

0-1 under 2= 719.05

27.30 24 months = $655

difference over 2 years = $655

0-2 over 4 = $1,093.45

0-2 over 2 = 891.25

202.20 12 months = $2,426.40

difference over 1 year = $2,426.40

Total $3,081.60 per officer

Added Training Costs - $489,073 Total

Personnel increases for training administration.

$489,073 ÷ 12,900 = $38.00 per candidate

Table 23 (Continued)

Added Program Administration

Personnel increases for personnel administration.

$252,909 ÷ 12,900 = $19.60 per candidate.

Total Cost Per Accession: $12,903.20 or approximately $12,900.
(Less OBC costs)

Table 24

Cost Per Commissionee of Army, Navy and Marine Corps Officer Programs (Less Post Commissioning Initial Schooling) Based on FY 75 Dollar Costs

Program	Cost Per Accession
U.S. Military Academy	$79,920[11]
U.S. Naval Academy	71,500[12]
NROTC 4 Year Scholarship	22,885[13]
ROTC 4 Year Scholarship	22,282[14]
NROTC Contract (Nonscholarship)	17,245[15]
ROTC (Nonscholarship)	13,036[16]
Collegiate Commission Program (Army Estimate)	12,900[17] (Less OBC costs)
PLC (Maximum Financial Assistance)	11,913[18]
Army OCS	11,309[19]
Marine Corps OCS	5,889[20]

Table 25

Program	Officers Produced	Cost Per Officer	Total Cost For 10 Officers	Number of Officers Remaining Beyond 10 Years	Cost Per Officer Beyond 10 Years (If computed at accession)
USMA	10	$79,920	$799,200	6	$133,200.00
USNA	10	$71,500	$715,000	6	$119,166.66
NROTC (SCH)	10	$22,885	$228,850	3.5	$ 65,385.71
ROTC (RA)(SCH)	10	$22,282	$222,820	4	$ 55,705.00
NROTC (NO SCH)	10	$17,145	$171,450	2	$ 85,725.00
Army OCS	10	$11,309	$113,090	.6	$188,483.33
Marine Corps OCS	10	$ 5,889	$ 58,890	2.2	$ 26,768.18
CCP	10	$10,231	$102,310	2.8 or 1.5	$ 36,539.00 or $68,206
PLC	10	$11,913	$119,130	2.8	$ 42,546.43
ROTC(FLIP) (NO SCH)	10	$13,036	$130,360	2.5	$ 52,144.00
ROTC OBV II	10	$13,036	$130,360	1.5	$86,906.66

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Table 26

Projected Army Officer Peacetime Strength (Line Officer + MSC) FY 77-82[21]

FY		Begin STR.	Losses	Gains	End STR.	Requirement
77	AA	71,151	6,602	6,065	70,614	70,614
	NG	26,773	5,172	4,618	25,882	25,882
	USAR	26,261	5,738	4,863	25,386	26,154
	Total	124,185	17,512	15,546	121,882	122,650
78	AA	70,614	6,489	5,671	69,796	69,796
	NG	25,882	4,573	4,502	25,811	25,811
	USAR	25,386	5,443	6,211	26,154	26,154
	Total	121,882	16,505	16,384	121,761	121,761
79	AA	69,796	6,406	6,339	69,729	69,729
	NG	25,811	4,470	4,418	25,760	25,760
	USAR	26,154	5,900	5,900	26,154	26,154
	Total	121,761	16,766	16,657	121,643	121,643
80	AA	69,729	6,315	6,169	69,583	69,583
	NG	25,760	4,415	4,362	25,725	25,725
	USAR	26,154	6,303	6,303	26,154	26,154
	Total	121,643	17,033	16,834	121,462	121,462
81	AA	69,583	6,486	6,486	69,583	69,583
	NG	25,725	4,416	4,502	25,812	25,812
	USAR	26,154	5,473	5,473	26,154	26,154
	Total	121,462	16,375	16,461	121,549	121,549
82	AA	69,583	6,520	6,520	69,583	69,583
	NG	25,812	4,509	4,520	25,882	25,882
	USAR	26,154	5,192	5,192	26,154	26,154
	Total	121,549	16,221	16,232	121,619	121,619

Table 27

Projected Army Officer Gains by Source (Line Officer + MSC) FY 77-82[22]

FY	Component	USMA	OCS	Dir. Apt.	Recall	AA Losses	ROTC	IRR	Misc.	Total
77	AA	770	500	713	35	--	3,727	--	320	6,065
	NG	--	1,235	365	--	796	650	1,437	135	4,618
	USAR	--	120	225	--	805	1,601	2,112	--	4,863
	Total	770	1,855	1,303	35	1,601	5,978	3,549	455	15,546
78	AA	950	750	212	50	--	3,609	--	100	5,671
	NG	--	1,300	361	--	818	1,000	888	135	4,502
	USAR	--	155	240	--	792	2,954	2,110	--	6,211
	Total	950	2,165	813	[illegible]	1,610	7,563	2,998	235	16,384
79	AA	950	750	312	50	--	4,157	--	120	6,339
	NG	--	1,300	353	--	756	1,149	725	135	4,418
	USAR	--	130	250	--	732	2,607	2,181	--	5,900
	Total	950	2,180	915	50	1,488	7,913	2,906	255	16,657
80	AA	950	750	321	50	--	3,978	--	120	6,169
	NG	--	1,300	349	--	793	1,362	423	135	4,362
	USAR	--	135	235	--	787	3,877	1,269	--	6,303
	Total	950	2,185	905	50	1,580	9,217	1,692	255	16,834
81	AA	950	750	339	50	--	4,277	--	120	6,486
	NG	--	1,300	360	--	770	1,714	223	135	4,502
	USAR	--	135	220	--	782	4,036	300	--	5,473
	Total	950	2,185	919	50	1,552	10,027	523	255	16,461
82	AA	950	750	337	50	--	4,313	--	120	6,520
	NG	--	1,300	362	--	727	1,690	306	135	4,520
	USAR	--	140	195	--	706	4,006	145	--	5,192
	Total	950	2,190	894	50	1,433	10,009	451	255	16,232

Table 28

ROTC Actual Opening Enrollment School Years 1974-75, 1975-76, 1976-77 and Projected Enrollments School Years 1977-78, 1978-79

			Enrollment			
SY			Male	Female	Total	
74-75	77-78	MS I	16,214	4,957	21,171	
	76-77	MS II	6,338	1,103	7,441	
	75-76	MS III	5,548	294	5,842	
	74-75	MS IV	4,892	0	4,892	
		Total	32,992	6,354	39,346	
75-76	78-79	MS I	19,933	6,462	26,395	
	77-78	MS II	7,951	1,857	9,808	
	76-77	MS III	5,993	709	6,702	
	75-76	MS IV	5,199	296	5,495	
		Total	39,076	9,324	48,400	
76-77	79-80	MS I	21,540	7,769	29,309	
	78-79	MS II	9,165	2,459	11,624	
	77-78	MS III	6,585	1,009	7,594	
	76-77	MS IV	5,461	620	6,081	
		Total	42,751	11,857	54,608	
77-78	80-81	MS I	**	**	30,000	*Projection
	79-80	MS II	**	**	13,895	
	78-79	MS III	**	**	10,060	
	77-78	MS IV	**	**	7,944	
		Total	**	**	61,899	
78-79	81-82	MS I	**	**	30,000	*Projection
	80-81	MS II	**	**	13,895	
	79-80	MS III	**	**	11,227	
	78-79	MS IV	**	**	9,426	
		Total	**	**	64,548	

Sources for Table 28:

Headquarters, Department of the Army, "Senior ROTC Cost Per Graduate Model" (Washington, D.C., 1976).

Headquarters, Department of the Army, "Information Paper: Senior ROTC Program DAPE-MPO-R" (Washington, D.C., 1976).

Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, "Final Preliminary SROTC Enrollment and Status Report," (Fort Monroe, Virginia, 1976).

Table 29

Growth in the ROTC Program from Baseline Year SY 74-75 and Growth Projections for SY 77-78 and SY 78-79 (Male and Female)

SY		Enrollment	Increase	% of Growth
74-75 (Base Line)	MS I	21,171		
	MS II	7,441		
	MS III	5,842		
	MS IV	4,892		
	Total	39,346		
75-76	MS I	26,395	5,224	24.67
	MS II	9,808	2,367	31.81
	MS III	6,702	860	14.72
	MS IV	5,495	603	12.32
	Total	48,400	9,054	23.01
76-77	MS I	29,309	8,138	38.44
	MS II	11,624	4,183	56.21
	MS III	7,594	1,752	29.98
	MS IV	6,081	1,189	24.30
	Total	54,608	15,262	38.79
*77-78	MS I	30,000	8,829	41.7
	MS II	13,895	6,454	86.73
	MS III	10,060	4,218	72.2
	MS IV	7,944	3,052	62.39
	Total	61,899	22,553	57.32
*78-79	MS I	30,000	8,829	41.7
	MS II	13,895	6,454	86.73
	MS III	11,227	5,385	92.17
	MS IV	9,426	4,534	92.68
	Total	64,548	25,202	64.05

Table 30

Incremental Growth in ROTC (Actual SY 74-77) (Projected SY 78-79) from the Previous Year

SY		Increase	% of Growth from Previous Year
74-75 (Baseline)	MS I	21,171 (Baseline)	
	MS II	7,441 (Baseline)	
	MS III	5,842 (Baseline)	
	MS IV	4,892 (Baseline)	
	Total	39,346	
75-76	MS I	5,224	24.67
	MS II	2,367	31.81
	MS III	860	14.72
	MS IV	603	12.32
	Total	9,054	23.01
76-77	MS I	2,914	11.04
	MS II	1,816	18.51
	MS III	892	13.31
	MS IV	586	10.66
	Total	6,208	12.83
77-78* (Projected)	MS I	691	2.36
	MS II	2,271	19.54
	MS III	2,466	32.47
	MS IV	1,863	30.63
	Total	7,291	13.35
78-79* (Projected)	MS I	0	0
	MS II	0	0
	MS III	1,167	11.60
	MS IV	1,482	18.65
	Total	2,649	4.28

Table 31 confirms Army officer (line officer) procurement in FY 75. This table is important in that it establishes a base for an actual production year which corresponds to the cost data (FY 75).

Table 31

FY 75 Line Officer Procurement (Objective and Actual)
Active Army Only[23]

	Objective		Actual		% of Obj.
Source	Male	Female	Male	Female	(Male Only)
USMA	860	0	823	0	95.7
ROTC	4,065	0	4,149	0	102.06
OCS	350	0	337	0	96.28
Dir. Appt.	368	350	15	350	4.08
Vo.Act. Du./ Misc.	0	0	230	0	--
Total	5,643	350	5,554	350	98.42

Graph 4: ROTC Production Requirements (Accessions) vs. Projected Beginning [illegible] Enrollment



B-16

Graph 5: Actual and Projected Growth in MS I Enrollment SY 74-75--SY 78-.



Graph 6: Actual and Projected Growth in MS II Enrollment SY 74-75--SY 78-79 (Growth Curve)



B-37A

Graph 7: Actual and Projected Growth in MS III Enrollment SY 74-75--SY 78-7 (Growth Curve)



Graph 8: Actual and Projected Growth in MS IV Enrollment SY 74-75--SY 78-7
(Growth Curve)



FOOTNOTES

[1] Department of Defense, Opening Enrollment Report School Year 1975-1976, (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, December 15, 1975), p. 4.

[2] Ibid., pp. 5-26.

[3] Yearbook of Higher Education 1974-75 (Chicago: Marquis Academic Media, 1974), p. 519.

[4] Ibid., p. 518.

[5] Department of Defense, "Officer Accession Plan (Line Officer + MSC) FY 77-82" (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1976), (n.p.).

[6] Yearbook of Higher Education 1974-75, op. cit., p. 538.

[7] Ibid., p. 518.

[8] Opening Enrollment Report School Year 1975-1976, op. cit., p. 26.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Department of Defense, "Cost Justification--Officer Procurement Programs" (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1976), (n.p.).

[11] Department of Defense, "Cost to Train a Lieutenant" (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, January 13, 1976), (n.p.).

[12] Based on Official Correspondence between Mr. Richard A. Wiley, Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, and the Honorable James T. Lynn, Director, Office of Management and Budget, March 11, 1976, (n.p.).

[13] Ibid.

[14] "Cost to Train a Lieutenant," op. cit., (n.p.).

[15] Wiley, op. cit., (n.p.).

[16] "Cost to Train a Lieutenant," op. cit., (n.p.).

[17] "Cost Justification--Officer Procurement Programs," op. cit., (n.p.).

[18] Wiley, op. cit., (n.p.).

[19] "Cost to Train a Lieutenant," op. cit., (n.p.).

[20] Wiley, op. cit., (n.p.).

[21] "Officer Accession Plan (Line Officer + MSC) FY 77-82," op. cit., (n.p.).

[22] Ibid.

[23] Department of Defense, "Line Officer Accession Requirement Study" (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1976), (n.p.).

APPENDIX C

ANALYSIS OF SOURCE MATERIAL

This appendix contains an overview of the information that was examined during the course of the study. A substantial amount of the data were not cited in the body of the study· however, this fact should not imply that the information is not relevant to officer procurement.

U.S. Statutes Relating to the Study

There are three statutes which have a bearing on the study: Title 10, U.S. Code, Title 39, U.S. Code and Public Law 92-172.

Section 600, Title 10, U.S. Code authorizes the various service secretaries to develop and implement officer candidate type programs for enlisted reserve members of the appropriate Armed Service.[1] The Marine PLC Program derives statutory existence from this law and the CCP, if it is established along the general lines of PLC, will also operate under Title 10, U.S. Code.

Title 37, U.S. Code deals, in part, with pay and allowances authorized to military service members.[2] Should the proposal regarding permanent authority for Public Law 92-172 be approved by the Congress, the stipend programs for both PLC and CCP will be authorized under Title 37, U.S. Code.

Public Law 92-172 is a temporary law that was scheduled to expire on June 30, 1976.[3] The law authorizes the payment of a stipend, at the same amount as the ROTC Subsistence Allowance, to eligible members of the PLC Program.[4] Congressional action taken in June, 1976, resulted in extension of the law until 30 June 1977.

Published Sources

The information that was used to review college enrollment projections through 1982 consisted of the Yearbook of Higher Education 1974-75 and Accredited Institutions of Higher Education. The Yearbook of Higher Education 1974-75 is essentially a statistical summary of virtually every significant fact regarding the college population, sources of money for colleges, numbers of instructors and identification of public and private institutions. Accredited Institutions of Higher Education confirms those colleges or universities that are accredited by one of the six regional accrediting associations.

The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S. is a series of essays edited by Mr. Lawrence J. Korb. The essays address all aspects of the military educational system from ROTC to the Army War College. These essays are written by members of the academic community and are generally critical of the military system.

Government Documents

Army Regulation 145-1 (AR145-1), The Senior ROTC Program is the Army's published document that governs the ROTC Program. This regulation prescribes detailed procedures that are to be used by professors of military science in the daily administration of the ROTC Program. AR 145-1 contains ROTC peculiar definitions and is an excellent source document for the technical aspects of administering ROTC.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command annually publishes an Opening Enrollment Report School Year ____. This report is a detailed review of ROTC sponsor colleges that includes: total undergraduate enrollment by sex, academic year and college; total ROTC participation by sex, academic year and college; and statistical summaries of total enrollment and ROTC participation levels by Army Region. Examination of this publication and the use of a calculator can produce nearly any statistic regarding the ROTC Program.

Marine Corps Order P1100.61C, Military Personnel Procurement Manual is the single source document that governs all Marine Corps enlisted and officer recruiting. The order is semi-technical; however, definitions are included. There are only limited available copies of this order and it is unlikely that the Marine Corps would provide a copy for permanent retention to a student engaged in research. The Marine Corps recruiting stations and officer selection offices maintain at least one copy of the directive and it may be possible to gain temporary access to the document provided the research is accomplished at the recruiting station or officer selection office.

NAVMC 8122, As An Officer Of Marines, is a publication designed to attract college graduates and undergraduates into Marine officer candidate programs. The book contains brief explanations of available programs and a large number of pictures of Marine officers at work. While this publication is somewhat elementary, it does provide some excellent basic information on Marine officer programs. As An Officer Of Marines is available through the Recruitment Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. 20380 or any Marine Corps Officer Selection Office.

The Congressional Record is an excellent source of information on the status of officer procurement programs; however, the research student must know what he is searching for, approximately when the proceedings took place and where they took place (House of Representatives or Senate). It is not uncommon for a particularly important proceeding to be reproduced into a pamphlet by a military service. For example, Admiral Finneran's testimony before the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. Senate was printed into a short pamphlet so that Marine action officers could have easy access to his testimony without retaining an entire copy of the June 3, 1976, Congressional Record. The pamphlet was titled Marine Corps Platoon Leaders Class and it was obtained from Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps in November, 1976.

Interdepartmental and intradepartmental letters are excellent sources of information regarding planned changes to existing programs. These letters normally precede any Congressional testimony and often contain the positions of the respective services regarding a particular issue. Letters frequently contain a great deal of information that is not presented before Congress and their primary value can be to document that a particular service initially objected to an issue and later apparently reversed its position. These letters are not normally available to the average researcher; however, it may be possible to obtain a copy of a particular letter from the originating office.

Unpublished Sources (Army)

The Army has a large amount of unpublished material regarding officer procurement. A particularly valuable source used in this study was the Army "Line Officer Accession Plan (Line Officer + MSC) FY 77-82." This plan, which is subject to frequent review, provides the basis for recruiting goals for all officer procurement programs, production requirements and total planned input to not only the Active Army, but the reserve components. The document might be released to a researcher through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs).

The majority of the remaining Army unpublished material deals with cost, retention, and officer procurement program enrollment levels. This information is essentially raw data maintained by action officers; however, it is primary source material. It is unlikely that much of this information would be released unless the researcher was specific about his intended use of the material.

Unpublished Sources (Marine Corps)

The Marines do not appear to have retained as much unpublished material regarding officer procurement as the Army. Records of officer program performance, cost and retention levels that were made prior to 1970 have either been destroyed or what little information is available is contradictory. Since

1970 the Recruitment Branch at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps has maintained detailed and excellent records that rival the Army's data. Detailed information is available on virtually every category of attrition or program completion; however, there is no single document that ties total attrition into one easily reviewed source. The data are maintained by fiscal year and separated by program.

If there is a weak area in Marine Corps officer procurement records, it is cost data. Program costs are difficult to find and even when discovered, the document is frequently a hand written memorandum. The cost estimates forwarded to agencies external to the Marine Corps are normally based on the handwritten memorandums. These memorandums are substantially different from the Army's cost estimates because they do not contain the deductive process that was used to compile the data.

FOOTNOTES

[1] U.S., General and Permanent Laws of the United States in Force on January 20, 1971, 10 U.S.C. 600.

[2] U.S., General and Permanent Laws of the United States in Force on January 20, 1971, 37 U.S.C., Supplement I.

[3] U.S., Marine Corps Officer Candidate Program Financial Assistance Act, Public Law 92-172 (1971).

[4] Ibid.

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